Terror Terminology
by Oliver north
Townhall.com

LOUISVILLE, Ky. -- The term "politically correct" is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary thus: "Of, relating to, or supporting broad social, political, and educational change, especially to redress historical injustices in matters such as race, class, gender, and sexual orientation." Add to that litany of "historical injustices" the title of my New York Times best-seller: "American Heroes in the Fight Against Radical Islam."

In recent weeks, the vocabulary police opened a new front in the war on terror by issuing a list of do's and don'ts for terrorism terminology. In an effort to fight a kinder, gentler war on Islamic radicals, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with unnamed Islamic interest groups, has issued a paper titled "Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations From American Muslims."

This policy document warns U.S. government officials against "using theological terms, particularly those in Arabic, even if such usage is benign or overtly positive. Islamic law and terms come with a particular context, which may not always be apparent." The paper goes on to counsel: "It is one thing for a Muslim leader to use a particular term; an American official may simply not have the religious authority to be taken seriously, even when using terms appropriately." In other words, we infidels have no street cred in the Islamic world.

We are told that we should no longer use words and phrases such as "jihadist," "Islamic terrorist" or "Islamist." Using the word "Islamic," the experts have advised us, may "concede the terrorists' claim that they are legitimate adherents of Islam."

At best, this advice is seriously flawed. At worst, it is an ominous recipe that invites defeat, for it begs us to ignore the identity of those who have declared war against the West in general -- and the U.S. in particular. The authors urge us to disregard the first axiom of war: If you don't know your enemy, you will lose.

In an interview for Fox News' "War Stories," Bernard Lewis (the dean of Mideast scholars) contrasted the way we fought fascism during World War II with the current conflict: "Then we knew who the enemy was. We knew who we were. Nowadays we have great difficulty in defining the enemy. We have to be careful not to offend anybody. We don't even seem to be able to define our own cause, let alone the enemy's. This kind of uncertainty makes it very difficult to carry on any sort of struggle."

Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security policy paper -- drafted with the help of anonymous "influential Muslim Americans" -- not only makes the current struggle more difficult but also is riddled with outright falsehoods. The document states, "The civilized world is facing a 'global' challenge, which transcends geography, culture, and religion." That statement defies reality. We didn't label al-Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah and Mahdi Army murderers (to name just a few of the groups I have seen in action) Muslim holy warriors; they did. We didn't call their savage suicidal bombing campaign an Islamic jihad; they did.

The Department of Homeland Security document insists that "Islam and secular democracy are fully compatible -- in fact, they can make each other stronger. Senior officials should emphasize this positive fact." That "positive fact" simply isn't. Save for Iraq and Afghanistan, where U.S. troops have become the protectors of Muslim women and nascent representative political institutions, there is no Islamic majority country where "secular democracy" flourishes. We didn't create these realities; Muslim leaders did.

Reality has little to do with this new wave of political correctness, and it goes well beyond this new DHS policy document. Muneer Fareed of the Islamic Society of North America told The Washington Times that he has contacted Sen. John McCain's office to urge him to "rethink word usage that is more acceptable to the Muslim community." Fareed is upset that McCain consistently refers to "radical Islamic extremism."

In London, the British government's Home Office has advised government officials that they should use words such as "violent extremism" instead of "terrorism." When fanatics carry out horrific attacks on innocent civilians in the name of Islam, the perpetrators should be referred to as "criminals" instead of "terrorists."

Not to be outdone in the political correctness department, the European Union has come up with guidelines on how to talk about terrorists who literally are dying to kill us. It warns, "Unintended stigmatization resulting from an ill-considered choice of words may have serious negative psychological effects and thus contribute to the process of radicalization." In other words, it's all our fault.

If we succumb to this kind of mindless mumbo jumbo and doublespeak to describe the Islamic radicals who are trying to kill us, we're courting uncertainty and defeat. Or as one very politically incorrect soldier put it plainly during a book signing this afternoon, we're screwed.

Investor's Business Daily political cartoonist and Senior Editor Michael Ramirez was yesterday awarded a Pulitzer Prize, his second and the newspaper's first. In awarding Ramirez, the Pulitzer panel lauded his "provocative cartoons that rely on originality, humor and detailed artistry." Michael Ramirez was a 2004 Lincoln Fellow of the Claremont Institute.

An example.....worth a thousand words?



Lincoln Fellow Michael Ramirez Wins Second Pulitzer

Interesting opening shots...Go John!


Senators Obama and Clinton have very different ideas from my own. They are both lawyers themselves, and don't seem to mind at all when fundamental questions of social policy are preemptively decided by judges instead of by the people and their elected representatives. Nor have they raised objections to the unfair treatment of judicial nominees. For both Senator Obama and Senator Clinton, it turned out that not even John Roberts was quite good enough for them. Senator Obama in particular likes to talk up his background as a lecturer on law, and also as someone who can work across the aisle to get things done. But when Judge Roberts was nominated, it seemed to bring out more the lecturer in Senator Obama than it did the guy who can get things done. He went right along with the partisan crowd, and was among the 22 senators to vote against this highly qualified nominee. And just where did John Roberts fall short, by the Senator's measure? Well, a justice of the court, as Senator Obama explained it -- and I quote -- should share "one's deepest values, one's core concerns, one's broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of one's empathy."

These vague words attempt to justify judicial activism -- come to think of it, they sound like an activist judge wrote them. And whatever they mean exactly, somehow Senator Obama's standards proved too lofty a standard for a nominee who was brilliant, fair-minded, and learned in the law, a nominee of clear rectitude who had proved more than the equal of any lawyer on the Judiciary Committee, and who today is respected by all as the Chief Justice of the United States. Somehow, by Senator Obama's standard, even Judge Roberts didn't measure up. And neither did Justice Samuel Alito. Apparently, nobody quite fits the bill except for an elite group of activist judges, lawyers, and law professors who think they know wisdom when they see it -- and they see it only in each other.

Isn't it amazing, but true! Who would benefit from allowing anyone to vote without IDs? If a person cannot get a valid ID then they don't vote... seems minimal.

Michael Ramirez is best known for his polititoons, but now he may very well have eclipsed that with his general donkoid anatomy knowledge.

Letter written by Col. Mike Walker, USMC (retired)
Generals Odom and Petraeus

Let me preface with the remark that I am both
disappointed and, in no small part, ashamed of the
personal partisan attacks on our military
professionals, past and present. Now it is General
Odom turn to be in this dishonorable line of fire and
next it will be General Petraeus.

There is nothing wrong with disagreeing with what
someone has said or written. It is wrong to attack
their character and integrity because you cannot take
having your edicts challenged. General Odom is a
great American. General Petraeus is a great American.
To pose otherwise is moral wrong.

The party zealots just do not get it. Let me see if I
can help to clearly define this issue. About a
century and half ago, during the bloodiest and most
divisive war in our history, General Winfield Scott
Hancock wrote:

“We are serving no one man; we are serving our
country.”

Too many politicians, living in the safe comfort
dearly bought by our citizens in uniform, seem unable
to accept this reality. Worse yet, some unabashedly
pat themselves on the back for the too frequent
disservice of putting partisan political gain ahead of
service to the nation. We, who are serving or have
served in uniform as Hancock did all those many years
ago, do not and will not. It is worth repeating:

“We are serving no one man; we are serving our
country.”

Now, on to my inadequate opining on General Odom’s
comments of 2 April 2008.

My major difficulty with the General’s comments is the
simplification of the people who live in Iraq into
single-word groupings such as the Sunni, the Shi’a,
the Kurds, etc. This strips away the essential
texture and complexity of the situation in Iraq and
the region making meaningful analysis too difficult.

It is reminiscent of the Cold War excesses about the
communist monolith or indivisible solidarity of the
USSR. Unqualified use of similar overreaching terms
hinders rather than help in our understanding of the
ground truth in Iraq.

The Sunni Arabs are not a single bloc. They share a
common religious and ethnic heritage but are more
diverse than is commonly understood. Part of this is
tribal; part is regional; part is political. Whether
they were raised in an urban or rural setting plays a
role. Their relative position within the Ba’athists
party and the defunct Saddam regime plays a part as
does the role of religion in their life. This is as
true for the insurgents who fought against us as for
those who fought with us. Similar arguments can be
made in regards to the Shi’a and Kurds.

Similarly, the actions that led to reaching the
“tipping point” in our favor al Anbar cannot be
described in terms of “the Sunnis did this” or “the
Sunnis did that.” The General is right when he states
that al Qaeda in Iraq, our most ruthless opponent,
only became a real threat when it became part of the
Saddamist’s plan to defeat the Coalition. That
decision turned into a strategic miscalculation on
their part.

We were only able to exploit that mistake because the
Coalition worked tirelessly to present a superior
alternative, a vision of a better Iraq, a brighter
future. He is also correct to point out that turning
point when the Saddamist’s broke with al Qaeda and
allied themselves with the Marines was a result of
actions that began years before the surge. The
process followed in al Anbar offers a way forward in
winning the fight in Iraq. The keys are the
development of Iraqi security services, outreach to
all Iraqis (friend and foe alike), strengthening the
government through elections, and economic
empowerment.

A purely tribal engagement model is problematic as the
General states. There are indeed cases of tribal
groups simply being temporarily bought off with no
long-term solution in the offing. But those cases are
exception, not the rule in al Anbar. The complexity
stems from the difficulty many Americans had with the
ease in which Iraqi leaders transitioned between roles
of tribal sheiks and western-style secular businessmen
and professionals. I recall hearing fellow Marines
refer to so-and-so as a Sheik to accentuate the tribal
influence on events. I also recall these same Iraqis
as referring to themselves as Engineer so-and-so,
Doctor So-and-so, etc. There were some who did
primarily use the title of sheik but there were more
cases of Americans misapplying or misunderstanding the
term in their dealings with Iraqi leaders in al Anbar.

The critical point in regards to al Anbar is not that
we risk losing the progress made there by continuing
to buy off local sheiks, however fleeting the gains
from that policy are. What is important is the
scheduling of local elections this October will go a
long way in healing the political divide with the
government in Baghdad.

Where we really risk losing our gains in al Anbar is
in the failure to ignite the private sector economy.
Without economic freedom there can never political
freedom. Without economic security, there can never
be military security in al Anbar. Where are the
returning detainees to go if there is no hope of a job
that provides a chance to build a career or support a
family?

Perhaps most unsettling is General Odem’s view on the
actions taken a few days ago by the Iraqi security
forces to rein in Sadr’s army. He characterized them
as disturbing. In this, I believe he is just plain
wrong. They were essential. Muqtada Sadr is Iran’s
last best hope for establishing suzerainty over Iraq.
The model is a variation of Iran’s efforts in Lebanon.

Sadr’s recent actions during the fighting Basrah are
an attempt at a replay of his past confrontations with
Coalition and Iraqi security forces. He gets a bloody
nose militarily but comes out stronger politically.
His forces are always outmatched but not a complete
rollover for his opponents. When the situation on the
battlefield inevitably turns against him, he calls for
ceasefire to escape an untenable military position in
order to rebuild his militia, the Madhi army.

What is different now is that Sadr’s political
position, rather than being strengthened, as in the
past, is now more perilous after the recent military
setback. This time, as the AP reported, “the major
political parties have closed ranks” against Sadr.
The LA Times quoted a Maliki supporter in Parliament,
Sami Askari as saying that although the action
directed that all parties disarm their militias,
“everyone understands this means mainly the Mahdi
Army.” One of Sadr’s legislators, al Rubaie was
quoted by the AP as saying that “Even the blocs that
in the past had supported us are now against us and we
cannot stop them from taking action in parliament.”

The major difficulty for Muqtada Sadr is that he is
not recognized as leading Shi’a cleric. He is a
strongman. He does have a following. But he is seen
as an illegitimate religious leader by the majority of
the Shi’a in Iraq and this is a fatal shortcoming for
anyone hoping to become their leader. That he has
sought refuge in Iran for the last year makes the
claim that he is a stooge of extremist Iranian mullahs
all the more damaging to his hopes of gaining support
amongst the Iraqi people.
In the past, the Shi’a political parties backed Sadr
because they saw his militia as a counterweight to al
Qaeda and its radical Sunni supporters. Now with al
Qaeda power ebbing, they no longer see the Madhi army
as such a good thing. Sadr has been forced to offer
up the disbandment of his militia.

General Odom points out that the most significant
obstacle to the plans of Muqtada and the Iranians is
the decision of Iraq’s Shi’a to look to their own
clerics rather than Persian surrogates. When the
deep distrust of Iran by many of Sunni is added to the
equation, the possibility of defeating Sadr’s army
becomes a realizable goal.

As Askari added in the LA Times article: “You can’t
put one foot in the political process and with the
other act in an army against the national government.
No one can accept this.” This is a clear declaration
that the “Hezballah/Hamas” model that follows Iran’s
game plan, is not only unacceptable to the Sunni
minority but the Shi’a majority as well.
This also brings into play the role of the Kurds. The
Kurds are the best practitioners of real politik in
Iraq. I sat in on several meetings with some of the
leading Kurdish politicians in Irbil during my first
tour in Iraq and they were the most united (by Iraqi
standards), sensible and calculating of the major
ethnic groups in Iraq. They will protect what is in
their best interests and are more willing than any
other political block in Iraq to compromise to attain
them.

They effectively contained then deescalated the 2008
Turkish-KKP military clashes in northern Iraq by
working within the Iraqi political system. Further,
they are supportive of the role the United States has
played in Iraq but are also willing to work
independently to further their goals to include
working with the Iranians.

This raises General Odom’s point regarding engaging
Iran. If any group could serve the role as an honest
broker between the United States and the Iranians, it
may well be the Iraqi Kurdish leadership.
Nonetheless, I harbor no illusions about the violent
revolutionary role Iran is playing within the region
and the Muslim world in general and cognizant of the
failures of past administrations to find any manner of
viable modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic.
Iranian actions beginning in 1979 and continuing on
through today have been the single greatest cause for
violence and instability in the region.

There is nothing in General Odom’s arguments to lead
me to believe otherwise. For those reason, I am very
pessimistic that anything, other than grief, will come
from any outreach to Iran for the foreseeable future.

The war in Iraq is the Coalition’s to win or lose. We
control our destiny there. It will be a long war as I
have been arguing for a number of years now but long
does not equate with defeat. And quickness, to
include any proposal for rapid withdrawal, does not
equate with victory.

Semper Fi,

Mike

Michael Ramirez cartoon editorials....I just can't stop myself from posting these here... Col. Walker has reminded us repeatedly about Sadr. Maybe someone will cut the tumor out.

A note from Col Mike Walker, USMC (retired)

Marines,

Here is the concluding piece of a three part series of articles published in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.

This is interesting look into how the war is protrayed in the midwest.

http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=729166

Semper Fi,

Mike

Enmity has evaporated
Marines return to calm in Iraq's Sunni Triangle
By MEG JONES
mjones@journalsentinel.com
Posted: March 17, 2008
Third of three parts

Hamimiyah, Iraq - It's midday as the Marines of Fox Company move out on a foot patrol under a sun obscured by swirling dust.

Clad in body armor and carrying M-16 rifles, they fan out to look for bombs and other weapons that insurgents may have buried in the countryside skirting the Euphrates River, which breathes life into the neighboring farm fields and olive groves.
Cpl. Jose Gonzalez, a 24-year-old carpenter from Kenosha, motions for his men to spread out and wait. On this day and this deployment, they're following a contingent of Iraqi police officers. One day very soon, the Americans hope, these men with their blue uniforms and AK-47s will take over security of their war-torn nation.

For the Marines of Fox Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines, the Iraq of their first deployment four years ago is not the Iraq they know today.

Here in the Sunni Triangle, Fox Company was attacked several times a day pretty much every day of its first deployment - by mortars, rockets, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, car bombs, rocket-propelled grenades, small-weapons fire and random potshots.

Four civilian American contractors were pulled from their vehicle not far from here and beaten to death by a mob, their burned corpses hung from a bridge. Not far from here, Fox Company lost five of its own to bombs and firefights.

Today the men of the Milwaukee-based Marine Reserve unit are surprised by the relative peace. They haven't been mortared. They haven't been shot at. Except to sight in on a firing range, they haven't fired their rifles. They've been hit by a few improvised explosive devices, but no one has been injured.

They're surprised by an Iraqi security force - one they knew in 2004 as mostly ineffective, lazy, clueless and corrupt - that appears to have its act together. Instead of leading the fight, the Marines are following and mentoring the Iraqis.
About one-third of the couple hundred Marines in Fox Company served a seven-month deployment in 2004-'05. Gonzalez was one of them.

"It's uplifting that our work is showing. Violence is down and the IPs (Iraqi police) are doing what they're supposed to be doing," said Gonzalez, who has been in the Marine Reserve five years and has two sons, 4 months and 2 1/2 years old, back home with his fiancée, Janette.

As Gonzalez keeps an eye on his Marines, the Iraqi police officers walk ahead of the Americans through farm fields and along the tops of irrigation ditches. They dig their toes into freshly turned dirt as they walk through the blackened remains of weeds and bulrushes burned by farmers. They check buildings and slowly pass metal detectors over the soil.

Every few minutes the metal detectors ring like circa mid-'90s cell phones, and the Iraqi officers use sharp knives to dig into the earth. The rusted, bent hulk of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher is found on a slope leading down to the Euphrates.
A Texas National Guard soldier points out to Gonzalez a house where three weapons caches have been found recently. Among the discoveries: grenades, rockets, 155mm mortar rounds, rocket-propelled grenades and large, lethal Molotov cocktails made from 5-gallon fuel cans primed with blasting caps.

Relatively few bombs are exploding and hurting people in Anbar Province, where violence has dropped significantly in the last year. Though suicide bombers and the deaths of innocents such as those in Karbala last month continue to make news, overall Iraq is a safer place, a fact borne out by the monthly drop in the number of terrorist attacks.

U.S. commanders say the surge of American troops and efforts to persuade former insurgents to fight with and not against coalition forces are working, and that years of training Iraqi police and soldiers are paying off.

Weary of terrorism

Most importantly, they say, the Iraqi people appear to have had enough of terrorism. Insurgents are losing the anonymity and safe havens they need to carry out attacks and build car bombs because residents, for the most part, no longer worry about men in black masks showing up at their homes at night and aren't afraid to report terrorist activity, said Lt. Col. Frank Charlonis, commander of 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines.

"I think al-Qaida overplayed its hand," Charlonis said. "There were a lot of nationalists and patriots who didn't want an occupying army, but al-Qaida hurt the people it was seeking for support. I think that's when many realized al-Qaida was a much worse option than us."

An Iraqi police supervisor identified only as Capt. Jamal, speaking through an interpreter at a police station in the Jazeera region, said that Iraq is better off without Saddam Hussein but that many Iraqis don't trust the government.
"The United States is helping us," he said of the training effort. "Without the U.S. Army, we would have nothing here."
Though the Fox Company Marines realize a quiet Anbar Province is good for Iraq, it has been a bit of a letdown since they arrived in late January, particularly for the guys on their first deployment who heard the war stories of the veterans and were expecting the worst.

"I was ready for it to be what it was like four years ago. Last time, we didn't have time to think, we just did," said Lance Cpl. Alan Breger, 22, a University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh business student. "In five weeks I've seen less than I saw in two days the last time."

Breger knew two of the Fox Company Marines who were killed in the first deployment, and a third was from his hometown of Oshkosh. He knows their killers were never caught.

"I try not to think of them while out here, because it just pisses me off," Breger said.
He wears a dark green braided bracelet in honor of the five fallen Fox Marines and has a tattoo on his leg of the rifle and helmet that's common at military funerals.

"It's a different ball game than it was the last time," Breger said. "We haven't done much of what people think Marines do out here - the hard-charging thing. We've almost become beat cops."
Added Cpl. Ryan Lackey, 22, of Milwaukee: "We got them all pumped up by our stories, and now it's slow."

Hot showers, better armor

Living conditions have improved. The Marines have hot showers, good chow, regular mail delivery, Internet access. Last time they ate prepackaged MREs and drank warm bottled water, and the wait for a shower could be 50 days or more.
Some of their gear has improved as well. Fox Company platoons roll out in the new MRAP armored vehicles, which are designed to better withstand bomb blasts. They wear flame-retardant jumpsuits and shirts. Their new body armor is more cumbersome but includes side plates to prevent shrapnel from piercing rib cages.

Memories of the five Fox Company Marines killed on the last deployment haven't faded. The Marines know that some of the former insurgents they're now working with could be responsible for their buddies' deaths.

"That's where professionalism has to come in. It's something that burns our asses. But there's nothing you can do," said Lackey, a UW-Milwaukee student.

Back on the weapons sweep patrol, Gonzalez stops and tells Lance Cpl. Terry Medema, 24, of Waupun to radio in a position report to other Fox Company members back at an Iraqi police station. As Gonzalez waits, he hears a cow mooing.
"Kind of makes me think of home," Gonzalez says.

Soon the patrol comes upon a two-room mud brick building that had once been a terrorist stronghold. On the filthy floor lie glass shards, crushed soda bottles and other debris. Sunlight shines through holes in the thatched roof. On one wall, about head-high, dangle knotted ropes.

Gonzalez is told the rope was used to tie the hands of hostages as they were tortured. Spray-painted in black on an outside wall is the name in Arabic of a well-known terrorist who formerly used this area, an interpreter says. A building nearby has a ceiling fan spattered with blood from hostages who were tied to it.

Gonzalez silently looks at the frayed ropes for a few moments, shakes his head.
"Crazy," he says quietly as he walks out.

Lance Cpl. Matthew Rittner, 25, a Milwaukee police officer, kneels in the dust close by, cradling his M-16 and scanning the countryside. The last time he was in Iraq, Rittner was in vehicles hit by improvised explosive devices three times. He also was involved in the 4 1/2 -hour firefight on Nov. 12, 2004, that killed Brian Prening, 24, a Plymouth High School graduate who had been in Iraq for two months.

'Everyone was against us'

"Last time it was more like we were fighting the enemy. It felt like everyone was against us," says Rittner, a 2001 Greenfield High School graduate.

On this deployment "I expected there to be more to do, more enemies. I don't want to say we're not doing anything, but sometimes it feels we aren't at war anymore," Rittner said.

An Iraqi police officer shouts, and Gonzalez and a few others slide down an embankment into mud and high weeds next to the river. The Iraqis dig up two 67mm rockets and carry them to a car. An Iraqi demolition team will dispose of them later.
"Something like that would probably be used for an IED," Gonzalez says.

The group starts walking again through the fields, passing sheep, chickens and cows, on the three-hour patrol. Families with small children smile and wave to the Iraqi police officers in front and the Marines bringing up the rear.

Michael Ramirez, this guy is a genius... I love the tone his cartoons take!

( From Mike Walker, Col. USMC, retired)

All,

From what I know, Senator Obama is a likeable and honorable man. He is intelligent, eloquent, and has the gift of a real leader in his ability to connect personally with his followers. But for all these strengths, I cannot support his candidacy for I am Marine veteran of the Iraq war and that makes all the difference.

My experience in the war in Iraq has left bad memories, tragic memories, and even horrific memories. This is to be expected as war is always a terrible thing. But they are neither the only memories nor the most important.

I will never forget arriving at the outskirts of Irbil in August 2003 after leaving Baghdad earlier in the day. It was just as the sun was setting and we pulled off onto an open field to finalize the link-up with our unit there.

Suddenly the children who had been playing soccer began to come our way. Soon we were mobbed by these Iraqi children. They were shouting and laughing and running about yelling “Americans, Americans!” We needed the parents to make a way for us through the waving crowd so we could get back on the road. It was a moving experience and one of those moments that changes your life forever.

I also vividly remember meeting with a large group of Iraqis who were trying to partner with a number of NGO’s in the late spring of 2004 to take the first steps towards building the new Iraq. They had come from all over the nation. They were Sunni and Shi’a, Arab and Kurd. The term they universally used to describe the March 2003 invasion of Iraq was “The Liberation.”

And I remember dining with a senior government official from al Anbar province in July 2004. He was a former Ba’athist and Sunni Arab. He described how he had been arrested by Saddam’s security forces and then savagely beaten and forced to live for six months in a bare concrete cell, in total darkness, that was so designed as to ensure that one could never stand up completely or stretch out when lying down to an uneasy rest.

But he did not dwell on the past. That night, his eyes were aglow with energy and vitality as he spoke to us with real passion of about the future of al Anbar. We had given back to him, and to hundreds of thousands like him, something that Saddam had taken away. We had given him back an indispensable and priceless commodity. We had given him back hope.

If you ask the Senator and his code-pink adherents whether or not they expect to erase my personal history of the war in Iraq, my memories of the smiling children, of liberation and of hope for Iraq, by supplanting them with a message of failure and despair, of cutting and running, their answer is a resounding chorus of:

YES, WE CAN!

YES, WE CAN!

YES, WE CAN!

Well Senator, for this Marine, the answer is and will always be:

NO, YOU CAN’T.

Semper Fi,

Mike

It is hard to understand how blind or incompetent our new congress is....How could this Be?

Four reasons to support his candidacy...
• He is fiscally conservative
• He is socially conservative
• He believes in a strong defense
• He is a communicator

"If a tree fell in Manhattan and no one was there to hear it did it's fall make a sound?"

It's been a year since the President announced the troop surge. Where is the "real" media coverage? It isn't with the MSM, they are only interested in sound bytes from cranky Dems and their general condemnation of the efforts. The real stuff is flowing from the "new media". Patraeus's plan is unfolding and Iraq is stabilising. There is a wealth of material that a "blind-folded" MSM passes daily in favor of reporting whatever it takes for a designated party to win an election. Shame on them, can a boycott be organized against the MSM for a day/week/month.... a protest to demand that their reporting align itself with the realities of our nation?

General Petraeus' Year-End Letter To The Troops

28 December 2007

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq:

As 2007 draws to a close, you should look back with pride on what you, your fellow troopers, our Iraqi partners, and Iraqi Coalition civilians have achieved in 2007. A year ago, Iraq was racked by horrific violence and on the brink of civil war. Now, levels of violence and civilians and military casualties are significantly reduced and hope has been rekindled in many Iraqi communities. To be sure, the progress is reversible and there is much more to be done. Nonetheless, the hard-fought accomplishments of 2007 have been substantial, and I want to thank each of you for the contributions you made to them.

In response to the challenges that faced Iraq a year ago, we and our Iraqi partners adopted a new approach. We increased our focus on securing the Iraqi people and, in some cases, delayed transition of tasks to Iraqi forces. Additional U.S. and Georgian forces were deployed to theater, the tours of U.S. unites were extended, and Iraqi forces conducted a surge of their own, generating well over 100,000 more Iraqi police and soldiers during the year so that they, too, had additional forces to execute the new approach. In places like Ramadi, Baqubah, Arab Jabour, and Baghdad, you and our Iraqi brothers fought—often house by house, block by block, and neighborhood by neighborhood—to wrest sanctuaries away from Al Qaeda-Iraq, to disrupt extremist militia elements, and to rid the streets of mafia-like criminals. Having cleared areas, you worked with Iraqis to retain them—establishing outposts in the areas we were securing, developing Iraqi Security Forces, and empowering locals to help our efforts. This approach has not been easy. It has required steadfastness in the conduct of tough offensive operations, creative solutions to the myriad problems on the ground, and persistence over the course of many months and during countless trying situations. Through it all, you have proven equal to every task, continually demonstrating an impressive ability to conduct combat and stability operations in an exceedingly complex environment.
Your accomplishments have given the Iraqi people new confidence and prompted many citizens to reject terror and confront those who practice it. As the months passed in 2007, in fact, the tribal awakening that began in Al Anbar Province spread to other parts of the country. Emboldened by improving security and tired of indiscriminate violence, extremist ideology, oppressive practices, and criminal activity, Iraqis increasingly rejected Al Qaeda-Iraq and rogue militia elements. Over time, the desire of Iraqis to contribute to their own security has manifested itself in citizens volunteering for the police, the Army, and concerned local citizen programs. It has been reflected in citizens providing information that has helped us find far more than double the number of arms and weapons caches we found last year. And it has been apparent in Iraqi communities now supporting their local security forces.

As a result of your hard work and that of our Iraqi comrades-in-arms—and with the support of the local populace in many areas—we have seen significant improvements in the security situation. The number of attacks per week is down some 60 percent from a peak in June of this year to a level last seen consistently in the early summer of 2005. With fewer attacks, we are also seeing significantly reduced loss of life. The number of civilian deaths is down by some 75 percent since its height a year ago, dropping to a level not seen since the beginning of 2006. And the number of Coalition losses is down substantially as well. We remain mindful that the past year’s progress has been purchased through the sacrifice and selfless service of all those involved and that the new Iraq must still contend with innumerable enemies and obstacles. Al Qaeda-Iraq has been significantly degraded, but it remains capable of horrific bombings. Militia extremists have been disrupted, but they retain influence in many areas. Criminals have been apprehended, but far too many still roam Iraqi streets and intimidate local citizens and Iraqi officials. We and our Iraqi partners will have to deal with each of these challenges in the New Year to keep the situation headed in the right direction.

While the progress in a number of areas is fragile, the security improvements have significantly changed the situation in many parts of Iraq. It is now imperative that we take advantage of these improvements by looking beyond the security arena and helping Iraqi military and political leaders as they develop solutions in other areas as well, solutions they can sustain over time. At the tactical level, this means an increasing focus on helping not just Iraqi Security Forces—with whom we must partner in all that we do—but also helping Iraqi governmental organizations as they endeavor to restore basic services, to create employment opportunities, to revitalize local markets, to refurbish schools, to spur local economic activity, and to keep locals involved in contributing to local security. We will have to do all of this, of course, while continuing to draw down our forces, thinning our presence, and gradually handing over responsibilities to our Iraqi partners. Meanwhile, at the national level, we will focus on helping the Iraqi Government integrate local volunteers into the Iraqi Security Forces and other employment, develop greater ministerial capacity and capability, aid displaced persons as they return, and, most importantly, take the all-important political and economic actions needed to exploit the opportunity provided by the gains in the security arena.

The pace of progress on important political actions to this point has been slower than Iraqi leaders had hoped. Still, there have been some important steps taken in recent months. Iraq’s leaders reached agreement on the Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation with the United States, which lays the groundwork for an enduring relationship between our nations. The United Nations Security Council approved Iraq’s request for a final renewal of the resolution that authorizes the Coalition to operate in Iraq. Iraq’s leaders passed an important Pension Law that not only extends retirement benefits to Iraqis previously left out but also represents the first of what we hope will be additional measures fostering national reconciliation. And Iraq’s leaders have debated at length a second reconciliation-related measure, the Accountability and Justice Bill (the de-Ba’athification Reform Law), as well as the 2008 National Budget, both which likely will be brought up for a vote in early 2008. Even so, all Iraqi participants recognize that much more must be done politically to put their country on an irreversible trajectory to national reconciliation and sustainable economic development. We will, needless to say, work closely with our Embassy teammates to support the Iraq Government as it strives to take advantage of the improved security environment by pursing political and economic progress.

The New Year will bring many changes. Substantial force rotations and adjustments already underway will continue. One Army brigade combat team and a Marine Expeditionary Unit have already redeployed without replacement. In the coming months, four additional brigades and two Marine battalions will follow suit. Throughout that time, we will continue to adapt to the security situation as it evolves. And in the midst of all the changes, we and our Iraqi partners will strive to maintain the momentum, to press the fight, and to pursue Iraq’s enemies relentlessly. Solutions to many of the tough problems will continue to be found at your level, together with local Iraqi leaders and with your Iraqi Security Force partners, in company and battalion areas of operation and in individual neighborhoods an towns. As you and your Iraqi partners turn concepts into reality, additional progress will emerge slowly and fitfully. Over time, we will gradually see fewer bad days and accumulate more good days, good weeks, and good months.

The way ahead will not be easy. Inevitably, there will be more tough days and tough weeks. Unforeseen challenges will emerge. And success will require continued hard work, commitment, and initiative from all involved. As we look to the future, however, we should remember how far we have come in the past year. Thanks to the tireless efforts and courageous actions of the Iraqi people, Iraq’s political and military leaders, the Iraqi Security Forces, and each of you, a great deal has been achieved in 2007. Thus, as we enter a new year, we and our Iraqi partners will have important accomplishments and a newfound sense of hope on which we can build.

As always, all or your leaders, our fellow citizens back home, and I deeply appreciate the dedication, professionalism, commitment, and courage you display on a daily basis. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with each of you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

David H. Petraeus

The latest post from Col. Mike Walker, USMC (retired)

Marines,

These guys never forget, never forgive, and never quit

There is credible merit in the argument that the CIA
destroyed the tapes of high-level Islamic terrorist
interrogations because they contained information that
could lead to the identification of the intelligence
officers.

A number of years ago, before the war, before 9/11, I
was working overseas for DIA DHS. We were actively
conducting HUMINT operations directed at possible
foreign Islamic extremists, amongst other threats.

The personnel I worked with were professional and
courageous. They dealt with these risks without
complaint and with determination.

But, for the record, let me state that the operations
directed against the Islamic terrorists entered into
another level of intensity. These were the only
operations where we not only had many of the local
people working with us flatly refuse to participate
but these were the only operations where our own
people voiced strong and reasoned reservations.

The concern was simple: If we did not take every
conceivable precaution to absolutely protect their
identities from the Islamic terrorists then our people
knew that the Islamic terrorists would likely issue a
death sentence for them and their families and the
sentence would remain in effect until their death,
however long that took.

I still recall a conversation with one of my best
operators on this subject. He was not complaining
about the risk. He knew the score and was still
willing to face being put on an Islamic terrorist
death list for life if that is what it took. His sole
concern was for the long-term safety of his family if
the Islamic terrorists were able to identify him.

If you have never seen how viciously savage these
Islamic terrorists are you cannot understand the
concerns of those on the front line fighting them.
This enemy never forgets, never forgives, and never
quits.

Semper Fi,

Mike Walker

A general letter from Col. Mike Walker, USMC (retired)

Marines,

By now you have all read the reports about the "town
meeting" at the HS Truman Building in Washington DC
regarding deployments to Iraq.

I will first state that the "death sentence" remarks
by the fellow in Foggy Bottom was a regrettable muddle
of panic and cowardice that can only be characterized
as disgraceful.

Hopefully these inane reactions are isolated for they
are cancerous in that they cannot but enfeeble the
organization.

Having written that, it is my opinion that those
remarks are not indicative of the performance of the
officers of the Department of State, especially of
those serving in Iraq.

The State Department officers I served with in Iraq
were exemplary. The names Stu Jones, Kieth Kidd, Hugh
Geoghan, Nate Jensen, and Kael Weston are names of
honor and sacrifice and all were from State.

I saw them on a daily basis work tirelessly in some of
the most dangerous parts of the al Anbar governorate.
The were routinely shot at, rocketed and mortared.
They were deliberately targeted for attack. Yet they
never shirked from their duty. They never allowed
personal risk to stand in the way their mission.

Those folks upheld the highest ideals of courageous
service to the United States of America. We should
take great pride in the fact that we have people like
this in our Department of State.

We should should not allow the comments of one aged
yet still callow soul to besmirch the honorable record
of so many outstanding members of the Department of
State.

Semper Fi,

Mike

Cartoonist Mike Ramirez at it again visually displaying what we all know is true.

Col. Mike Walker (USMC retired) provides an article
written by BGen Dave Reist

Anbar: Feb 06-Feb 07
Moving the Ball down the Field
Focus on Economics, Governance, & Tribal engagement


Of late, Al Anbar province has been touted as the model for how to quell the dilemma faced in Iraq. As the surge is unfolding, Anbar is referred to as “The place where it worked” and some feel copying Anbar successes would mean success in Baghdad – and the rest of Iraq. This missive is intended to put into perspective what was done from Feb 06 through Feb 07 (and before that) that could have laid some of the foundation that has resulted in the successes currently enjoyed in Al Anbar province that II MEF is exploiting superbly. This piece will not serve as a template of “How to do it everywhere else in Iraq.” That caution is offered up front as the complexities of time, situation, culture throughout the country, and so many other variables make a “Recipe for success” an over-simplification for an extremely complex problem. It is safe to say that lessons learned in ANY counterinsurgency are applicable in bits & pieces, but to take one recipe in total is imprudent. One last qualifier, I will not focus on the tactical battles. The security LOO is crucial and a certain level of security is paramount for progress in a counterinsurgency.

Names will not be used as some events are still unfolding and mentioning Iraqis could endanger them.

On the Waterfront

In looking back at how Anbar has unfolded, I can’t help but recall the celluloid classic of 1953 entitled “On the Waterfront.” In this film, Johnny Friendly (played by Lee J. Cobb) has a tight grip over the waterfront – he controls who works, who doesn’t work, he gets his cut, he twists arms and breaks heads when needed, etc – in sum, total corruption maintained by murder and intimidation. The film starts with the murder of Joey Doyle. Terry Malloy (played by Marlon Brando) unwittingly assists in luring Joey to the roof the night before he was to testify against Johnny Friendly. Friendly’s thugs kill him by throwing him off the roof. Terry Malloy befriends Joey’s sister Edie (played by Eva Marie Saint) and she starts getting him to see the corruption. In addition, a local priest, Father Barry (played by Karl Malden), works to get Terry to testify against Johnny Friendly, and convinces him that the thugs are really hurting the workers and the docks, not helping them. Father Barry invites Terry to a meeting at a local church that is broken up as Johnny’s thugs surround the church and beat the attendees with baseball bats. Father Barry points out that Johnny Friendly will eventually kill anyone in his way, and this point is shown when Johnny Friendly kills Terry’s brother Charlie (played by Rod Steiger) who works for Johnny Friendly. Terry finds his brother murdered, hanging by longshoreman hooks after Charlie could not sway Terry (his own brother) not to testify against Johnny Friendly – murder to intimidate. This event did not intimidate Terry, but rather cemented his will against Johnny Friendly and he boldly testified and then went to the docks and took a beating. He lived, served as the lone wolf willing to stand up amongst sheep, and the sheep followed his lead and Johnny Friendly was finished. I’ll let you draw the parallels as the story of Anbar unfolds.

Thoughts up-front:

- We are playing 3 level chess, not checkers. Iraq is complicated.
- We can’t afford to loose in Iraq.
- We have to ask who is “driving” in Iraq. We have an Ambassador, an MNFI Commander, and a legitimately elected Government. Think unity of effort here.
- It’s not about money, it’s all about money. It’s always about money. There are other factors that contribute, but remember – MONEY.
- Differentiate between Insurgency and Resistance, because Iraqi’s do. Resistance fighters are those who do not want us in their backyard. Insurgents are the die-hard folks who need to be killed. AQI = Insurgents. This differentiation is not germane today (Aug 07) as any “resistance” is advertised by the local tribes as affiliation with AQI.
- If you ever hear someone say “This is the solution” or “Just do that” – run away from them. They do not understand the complexities of the situation – they are checker players. People who write books about the books they’ve read or repeat thoughts from other people are not who we need here.
- Cultural sensitivities are important. We spend a lot of time on this. We should continue to do so. BUT, if you are rude in America you will be rude in Iraq – just be a decent human being and it goes a long way.
- Perceptions of Anbar from Baghdad and vice versa. Anbar sees Baghdad as Shia led, Iran backed/controlled. Baghdad sees Anbar as those former Sunni’s who used to be in control and now it is our turn (maybe some payback here).
- Shame & Honor (this point is taken from a retired Army Officer & from Judith Miller in “God has Ninety-Nine Names”): Hearts and minds is over-used and it is more important to understand the dynamics of shame & honor. This is extremely complex, an antithesis of western culture, and goes to the heart of tribalism and understanding how things are done and why.
- Who is the real Sheik? If you ask anyone if they are a Sheik, they will probably say yes, at some level. Sheik is odd term that could imply a no-kidding tribal Sheik, a Sheik because of wealth, a Sheik because Saddam made Sheik’s to undermine the tribal influence in Anbar, etc. If you are ever in the room together and ask who the real Sheik is though, they all know.
- Sherman stated “War is cruelty. There’s no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.” Are we cruel enough for this war?

Looking Forward through the past: February 2004

I MEF entered Anbar province relieving the 82nd Airborne Division. Because Marines had a greater number of forces to apply against the problem, they were able to place forces where the 82nd could not. This is not a “Marines vs. Army” statement, just a statement of shear numbers and how a US Army Division is structured compared to a MAGTF (the surge in placing more troops on the ground is aimed at the same resultant). In doing so, the forces get into areas in which the enemy had enjoyed total freedom of action. This freedom translates into the ability to effect the local population and sway matters their way. The introduction of additional troops resulted in the insurgent grip being threatened, and increased casualties resulted (as happened in the surge).

CPA guidelines resulted in some things that negatively impacted Anbar. First, de-baathification resulted in many former Iraqi Army being out of work. As much of the leadership in Saddam’s Army was Sunni, many Anbari’s now had no job. Looking for employment was virtually impossible, and these former unemployed were prime candidates for the insurgency to sway to become resistance fighters. Also, throughout Iraq state owned enterprises (SOEs) were opened to private investment that never materialized and these SOEs stagnated. Result: More unemployment (or workers not receiving their full pay as the central Government continued to make partial payment to workers) that added to discontent.

Amidst all of the above, a NGO conference was held in Amman in Mar 2004 that looked at revitalization of Anbar. The MEF had LNOs in Amman and this conference was seen as a positive sign so the following month the MEF supported a conference that brought together businessmen – the embryonic Al Anbar Business Association (ABA) was formed. Key to this meeting was support from both Jordanian and Iraqi government ministries existed. A follow-on conference in Bahrain was held and MEF leadership at the highest levels attended. The signal was there were options to kinetics, and if security could be brokered, advances may occur. It is important to realize all this occurred after four US contractor bodies were hung in Fallujah. As Fallujah fell farther into dis-repair, a fall business conference in Dubai was planned that had 200 Anbar businessmen ready to attend. In November, the battle for Fallujah occurred and the Dubai business exchange was cancelled.

It must be noted that tribal engagement had occurred before the ground war and prior to Jan 06 with engagement taking place at various levels and in varying areas throughout Anbar. The point here is engagement takes time.

II MEF’s time in Anbar

II MEF was faced with conducting elections and operations in the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV). The elections piece was huge and it took a Herculean effort. A key point to mention is the Sunni’s boycotted the election and missed an opportunity to influence the action to adequately represent their party (or tribe) at the provincial level and in Baghdad. Hence, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) had the preponderance of the seats in the Anbar Provincial Council. This translated into the IIP determining who the Governor was, and Governor Mamoun was placed in the Governor’s chair – and remains today.

I MEF had fought Fallujah in November 04 and squeezed the insurgents out. II MEF chased the insurgents up the WERV throughout 05, all the way to Al Qaim. Al Qaim is crucial though, because it was the first effort that witnessed US and tribal forces working together to oust the insurgents that resulted in subsequent police recruitment. This is the model of integration of capabilities. The insurgency has attempted to creep back into Al Qaim, but the security that has come with a permanent CF presence, coupled with the tribal buy-in to keep the insurgents out has been the key to keeping them out. Police recruiting increased immediately after the insurgents were pushed out of Al Qaim. This is what is currently happening in Ramadi (started in summer 06 and is being championed today) that is being heralded as a ground-breaking effort: II MEF established the model in 05. In the spring of 2006, in the small town of Baghdadi (north of Hit), the same thing happened as local forces pushed against the insurgents. Police recruitment soared and men from that area were placed in formal training. This is another example of “A model” that worked before the Ramadi Awakening (to be discussed).

Also critical was a meeting held 29 Nov 05. Many key Sheiks, Iman’s, and leaders came together in Ramadi. The purpose of the meeting was to gather the key players and simply determine what could be done by working together. As the insurgents had been decimated in Fallujah, then chased up the WERV, they were making their way to Ramadi and they used this meeting to ID targets for murder to intimidate. From Dec 05 to March 06, insurgents selectively murdered approximately 10 influential Iraqi’s in Ramadi that forced all others in Ramadi to go underground. Insurgents had a grip on the city that was tightening, and the M&I campaign accelerated that grip. It also forced any progress that was started to happen in Governance to wane, and quickly.

I MEF (Fwd) arrival in theater

Prior to deploying, I MEF (Fwd) held an Economic and Governance Conference in Camp Pendleton that brought together an eclectic group. The purpose of the conference was to look at what could be done in these “Lines of Operation” (LOOs) and develop a plan. MNFI, MNCI, Iraqi ministry, academia, OSD, independent businessmen, USAID, Department of State, and more attended and it was quickly realized the issue was complex and required a long term approach. No false pretenses were arrived at and a “Quick win” was out of the picture. It was readily apparent that sustained, dedicated operations in these LOOs that would be required in order to make a difference – and as stated before, security was paramount. Sponsored (and attended) by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation Agency), it became readily apparent that jobs and productivity were paramount to an Anbar solution. While it was clear that there were a lot of challenges to be overcome, there would also be a lot of resources to draw upon as Anbar is loaded with raw materials: oil, gas, bauxite, agriculture, etc.

Arriving in theater, the M&I campaign had served its purpose. Ramadi was spiraling downhill, but Fallujah was slowly improving and Al Qaim was quietly the “Jewel” of the province. We wanted to “Meet the Sheiks” but the local ones would not come forward and many had fled to Amman. Amman offered safety for those who could afford to relocate and is a traditional hub for business as well as a town that many Sunni’s in Anbar had relations or dual households. It is estimated that somewhere between 500K to 1 Million Anbari’s have taken residence in Amman for a variety of reasons. I MEF (Fwd) placed an LNO in Amman. His arrival caught the attention of the Anbari’s and they asked, “The Marines are back and what do they want?”

It is important to emphasize that limited dollars was available at this point – both from the Iraqi Government and the US Government. Iraqi funding was caught in the tight grip of a non-functioning government (either intentionally or unintentionally) and US funding (in the form of CERP) was not available in adequate amounts because the budget had not been passed. CERP funding did not become tangible until July 2006. This lack of funding resulted in the inability to empower the provincial government to hire contractors, reward locals, and in general make progress.

Death of a Sheikh

In March 2006, a prominent Sheik died unexpectedly while undergoing surgery in France. He was from a large tribe in Anbar and he had been outside Anbar for years as his business was run from Amman, but his tribe was still prominent. The wake (a four night affair) would be held in Jordan and we received notification from civilians (who had attended our Econ/Gov conference) to attend the wake – it is the right thing to do. Approval was granted and this opened more gates than we’ll ever know. By simply being at this funeral, it showed respect and demonstrated that the Marines where serious about talking with the Sheiks. From this participation, 75 businessmen from Fallujah agreed to come to Amman in May and meet with businessmen from the region – some US businessmen attended. Supported by DUSD (BTA), this conference was intended to simply put businessmen together in the same room. We had been looking to engage with the “Top tier sheiks” and they were not to be found, so we jumped on this opportunity. The conference did exactly what we wanted, and while at this conference, the “Top Tier Sheiks” quietly approached us and asked if we were interested in meeting with them. In retrospect, they found us, we did not find them. Later in May, again with the support of DUSD (BTA) a conference was held with the “Top tier Sheiks” and this continued to keep the ball rolling. Two issues here: In defining the Top tier Sheiks, it is not implied that all the Sheiks/tribes were represented. They made the guest list and defining who is “Top tier” is contentious. Second, the gathering of these “Top tier” resulted in some friction that created some chasms. It was viewed that meeting and talking was better than non-meeting and we were sure that even if someone was omitted, they were “In the know.”

Our LNO in Amman continued the ball rolling. In meeting the Top tier Sheiks; the intent was to pursue numerous initiatives. Encouraging the Sheiks to return to Anbar was key, as this would send a signal that normalcy was returning to the province. We encouraged the Iman’s to attempt to influence the messages coming from the mosques on Friday. We did not want to attempt to shape the message, we simply asked it not be anti-coalition or inflammatory. We also asked to influence the action against the insurgents – stated another way, assist in getting them out of Anbar as it was to their benefit to rid their homeland of this problem. We asked them to invest in the province. All of these were viewed as long term.

Economics: Task Force for Business and Stability Operations – Iraq (TF-BSO)

Unemployment in Iraq is high, by any standard. Figures from USAID list unemployment and underemployment at around 55%. Without work, Iraq is a recruiting haven for insurgents. DUSD Paul Brinkley had visited Iraq several times and as his perspective evolved, at the urging of then MNCI Commander (LTG Chiarelli) and at the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense England, TF-BSO was formed. He focused on economic revitalization of Iraq. The philosophy is simple: Jobs create fewer personnel on the street who can be co-opted by insurgents and there is a feeling of honor again in having a job and being a productive Iraqi. This involved two key elements: restoring state-owned enterprises (SOEs, i.e., factories) thus reestablishing business connections between sources of demand and potential Iraqi factories and linking Iraqi industry to the global economy. An assessment of dormant or partially running factories has been conducted and coordination with the Iraqi ministries and MNFI in attempting to get as many factories back on line as possible is underway. Also, senior executives from American and international industry have been brought to Iraq to provide support for Iraqi revitalization. This is the deep fight, seeds need to be planted, and a security posture needs to allow this to unfold.

The efforts of the TF are needed and are a good primer. It has been proffered by some that DoD needs to get out of this initiative and commercial business involvement is needed for this effort to truly gain traction.

The Awakening in Ramadi

In late summer/early fall of 2006, a movement by a Sheik arose. Simply stated, a Sheik banded together with a few other Sheiks, banded with coalition forces, and fought the insurgents. They also encouraged the “Sons of Anbar” to join the police. Both of these measures were huge. First, in the tribes joining the fight against the insurgents it created a scenario in which the local population no longer allowed the insurgents safe havens. The growth of the police put locals on the beat, and their intelligence, as well as Sunni’s now seeing Sunni’s in their neighborhoods was a tremendous plus. Up to this point in Ramadi, few police were being recruited – some, but not enough to make a difference. Stated another way: Men would not join the police in adequate numbers until the Sheiks allowed it to happen.

In Anbar there are approximately 88 tribes that fall under the Dulaymi Federation, of which 15-18 are considered prominent tribes. The Sheik who founded the Awakening was not from one of the prominent tribes. He was not the Sheik of his tribe. The dynamics of how he rose to power and who joined him (and who didn’t join him) are fascinating, in some cases a matter of opinion, and honestly to all Americans and most Iraqi’s not completely known. This topic could be a complete paper itself, but suffice it to say the Awakening movement served the causes of the coalition forces.

The challenge in dealing with the Awakening was to get the tribal entities to work in coordination with the existing Anbar Government to maximize progress via unity of effort in Anbar. This was a delicate matter because the Awakening had not participated in the election process and did not have representation on the Provincial Council. As their movement came to the forefront, they thought they should have a greater say in the governance process, and they had already established a back door relationship with the highest levels of Government in Baghdad. Some felt the Awakening should have the lead in governing Anbar as they were having the greatest impact (remember here successes in Al Qaim and Fallujah counters this). Others felt elections should be held as soon as possible as to better provide a more accurate representation of Anbar Province within the Provincial Council – this would take a mandate from the Central government, and one that was barely functioning in most opinions. The Governor was routinely making weekly trips to Baghdad and lobbying the Iraqi Government. This was happening at the same time the Awakening was dealing with Malaki and he “authorized” the existence of units (that were police like) but did not appropriate for them. What this created was the emergence of forces under the Awakening not trained through any ISF formal structure but operating in Ramadi. Some saw this as the potential to be viewed as a militia – a dangerous concept as Sadr’s militia was being targeted by the coalition forces. Throughout the fall of 2006, the Awakening, the Provincial Council, and the Governor met on numerous occasions, worked matters, and the Awakening forces were integrated into formalized training. The Awakening was also given seats (by appointment) in the Provincial Council. This unity of effort in fighting the insurgents, communicating with Baghdad, and speaking with a unified voice was huge.

Tipping Point

Many have said Anbar is at a tipping. It may be and if so, why. Many factors contribute to this:
- Tribal unity against the insurgents: Huge point
- Competency of ISF: This includes police, army, and border forces, and placing qualified advisors is the key. Two points here: Police are more effective than the Army in curbing the insurgency (Army was mainly Shia and Sunni’s of Anbar did not receive Army forces well – and vice versa as Shia Army at times abused the Sunni population) and closing the border was seen as a critical measure to control what was coming into Iraq (the Iraqi’s have a saying “Do not try to dust the house with the windows open).
- Murder & Intimidation: The more the insurgents use this tactic, the more they drive the local population to embrace the coalition message. On the other hand, the coalition forces must watch how heavy handed they are, for fear of driving the local population towards the insurgents.
- Economic growth: Employment offers an alternative to accepting financial rewards from insurgents.
- National Government support: If Baghdad supports Anbar, what a plus this would be. This support needs to come in a cash flow that supports Anbar programs and promotes growth. However, the Central Government needs to demonstrate its commitment to providing for the welfare of Anbar Province not just through the budget, but in other areas such as fuel and power allocation.
- PRT proficiency: The embedded PRTs at the RCT/BCT level are proving effective and a totally flushed out PRT and the MNF-W level makes a huge difference. It is unfortunate it took this long for this to come to fruition.
- Foreign Investment: This would have tremendous impact as it would show the environment supports investment and confidence would soar. This is feasible, but the mechanism to make it happen is delicate. Again, this is an area where the Central Government has an opportunity to help by passing investment laws that will be attractive to foreign investors.
- Crime: At this point it is hard to differentiate between what is criminal and what is insurgent activity. Also, with all the money going towards projects and possible growth, this attracts nefarious people. As much effort that goes into defeating the insurgency should go towards monitoring criminal activity IOT prevent money being squandered.
- Sunni tolerance of the insurgency wanes: This is huge.

Final thoughts

We need the elements of National Power present in Iraq and we need them integrated. We need Treasury, Commerce, Justice, State, etc all in Iraq maximizing the areas that they can lend a hand too. Key here is unity of effort. When the above agencies send representatives, we need first-string players, not representatives.

Two mandatory books to read are the Old Testament because we are all sons of Abraham and the history of the Peloponnesian Wars by Thucydides as war is timeless.

Americans are arrogant or perceived as arrogant. This will not change, realize it, and simply be nice. You will never be able to get the “US stink” off you.

Democracy is a great concept but to strive for democracy in Iraq is a bridge too far (after all, the US is a Republic and arguably the most stable Government in the area is a Monarchy (Jordan)). We need to watch how we use this word.

Reservists are key. The tool set brought to the table by our reservists are crucial and their skills are priceless when working economic and governance issues. Shop for those skills.

Iran: The Sunni’s mantra was Iran is the problem. It was not until the State of the Union address in January 2007 that a public remark was first made against Iran. When asking the Sheiks about this statement, they responded, “That was very good and what will be said next?” Most were kind in not saying “What took you so long?” -- although some did.

Process vs Result: Process is important, but get a result. If your process is good you will get a result. If you do not get a result, but want to cling to process improvement and refinement, you risk spinning in a circle – and in war this is unacceptable. To use a sports analogy, when you leave the field, if you do not have more points on the scoreboard than the other guy, you lose. Talking about the nice block during the 3rd quarter (process) is nice but how many points are on the board (result) and did you win the game?

Economic initiatives: Before getting into specifics, the overarching thought in elements below is to have gangsters of capitalism replace gangsters. Security will be enhanced by businessmen protecting their assets. The creation of jobs will limit the population for the insurgents to draw from and hopefully create an environment that the people of the Iraq chose peace, prosperity, and economic growth over war. This means they keep the insurgents out.

The Anbar telecommunications capability is broke. It consisted of in-ground cooper lines to begin with that had no potential to support the province. The insurgents demolished what existed. Cell phone capability was minimal, and insurgents destroyed cell phone towers that cut that capability. Recently, re-establishment of cell phone towers has re-established cell phone capability in portions of the province. What the province needs is wireless local loop (WLL). WLL offers both voice and data capability (cell phone does not allow for data). Data would allow businessmen to operate on the internet – this is HUGE. It is totally doable, is minimal cost, and has a huge profit margin for whoever invests. There are some concerns, but WLL has been the choice in virtually every country that has to build from the ground up and Anbar is a prime candidate.

Anbar has tremendous gas & oil reserves. The people that need to know about this already know, and it is as simple (and complex) as the central government sorting out the business laws that allow for foreign investment. Foreign investment is a must because of the dollar value and capabilities required to fully exploit these raw materials. The Shia’s in Baghdad are well aware of the future monetary potential of Anbar gas & oil reserves and this is a large stumbling block in determining legislation for how the profit is divided.

Electrical power is the backbone of industry and Anbar (and most of Iraq) has a fragile skeletal system. It is antiquated, is in disrepair, is an easy target, and is being stressed at the same time it is being improved. This is a long term effort and crucial to economic growth as industry needs consistent power, not 12 hours a day. Large generators are an initial solution, but building additional dams, solar/wind power, etc all will add to solving this crucial problem.

Agriculture: It is estimated that only 20% of the capacity of farming in Anbar is being tapped. The potential is endless and not just farming. Crops are just the beginning and even just maximizing this would not only create jobs but allow Iraq to feed itself. Jobs created in harvesting, packaging, distribution, sales, etc would be huge. Agricultural centers (Co-Ops) that would branch into livestock would only add to the boom.

Microfinance loans: This initiative will allow the smaller businessman to engage. Economic growth needs both a top down and bottom up approach. This program is just getting off the ground and should have happened years ago but did not for a variety of reasons.

A credible banking system is needed. There is interest in making this happen.

Iraqi Railroad (IRR): A track that enabled commerce to be conducted all the way to the Al Qaim was opened in 2006. This enhances distribution and the transport of any goods and shows confidence that a sense of normalcy is returning. More track repair is ongoing and the potential for passenger movement (which was done in the past) is being considered again.

The number of opportunities to stimulate economic growth are endless in Anbar. It is truly a chicken-and-egg scenario when dealing with economic growth and security: Which comes first? An Iraqi general once stated, “A Hand Alone Cannot Clap.” By this he meant that the combination of economics and security will feed each other and create the endstate. Iraqi’s are innovative businessmen and they are primed to make money (remember, it’s all about money). Even if the security posture is totally set, without jobs (other than ISF) the country will stagnate.

Conclusion

Positive progress in Anbar has been the result of iterative, continual, and consistent actions by coalition forces. Each MEF has pushed the ball down the field after the hand off from their predecessors. Security actions (AL FAJR, RIVERGATE, etc) have gone into areas, maintained a presence within the town and their people, built up the IP and the IA, and progress has resulted. Economic and Governance initiatives have been integrated with the Security LOO and this synergy in the LOOs has produced the most dynamic result. The challenges and opportunities need to be assessed daily to make needed course corrections and closely watch the dynamics of tribalism within Anbar. Results in Anbar and tribalism reverberate well beyond the Anbar borders and have impacts throughout the entire Middle East – this is evident today with the success in Anbar. There are massive amounts of money at play at this juncture and power and long-term posturing is a daily occurrence. Marines have done a good job of remaining consistent while adapting to opportunities; this must continue. What comes next? How are opportunities exploited?

Columbia, The Propaganda Tool
Carol Platt Liebau

This piece indicates that, predictably, Ahmadinejad is using his speech at Columbia as a propaganda tool. His invitation to speak there is being spun as a hunger on the part of Americans for "correct and clear information about global developments," which he, presumably, will provide.

Congratulations to Columbia's president, Lee Bollinger -- he's just allowed his university to be used as a propaganda tool by one of the world's most despicable regimes.

Perhaps one of the "tough questions" he might ask Ahmadinejad is this: Will Ahmadinejad encourage one of Iran's universities to permit President Bush to deliver a speech there, offering "correct and clear information about global developments"? I wouldn't hold my breath.

Interesting read....

Propaganda Redux
Take it from this old KGB hand: The left is abetting America's enemies with its intemperate attacks on President Bush.

BY ION MIHAI PACEPA
Tuesday, August 7, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT(Wall Street Journal)

During last week's two-day summit, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown thanked President Bush for leading the global war on terror. Mr. Brown acknowledged "the debt the world owes to the U.S. for its leadership in this fight against international terrorism" and vowed to follow Winston Churchill's lead and make Britain's ties with America even stronger.

Mr. Brown's statements elicited anger from many of Mr. Bush's domestic detractors, who claim the president concocted the war on terror for personal gain. But as someone who escaped from communist Romania--with two death sentences on his head--in order to become a citizen of this great country, I have a hard time understanding why some of our top political leaders can dare in a time of war to call our commander in chief a "liar," a "deceiver" and a "fraud."

I spent decades scrutinizing the U.S. from Europe, and I learned that international respect for America is directly proportional to America's own respect for its president.

My father spent most of his life working for General Motors in Romania and had a picture of President Truman in our house in Bucharest. While "America" was a vague place somewhere thousands of miles away, he was her tangible symbol. For us, it was he who had helped save civilization from the Nazi barbarians, and it was he who helped restore our freedom after the war--if only for a brief while. We learned that America loved Truman, and we loved America. It was as simple as that.

Later, when I headed Romania's intelligence station in West Germany, everyone there admired America too. People would often tell me that the "Amis" meant the difference between night and day in their lives. By "night" they meant East Germany, where their former compatriots were scraping along under economic privation and Stasi brutality. That was then.

But in September 2002, a German cabinet minister, Herta Dauebler-Gmelin, had the nerve to compare Mr. Bush to Hitler. In one post-Iraq-war poll 40% of Canada's teenagers called the U.S. "evil," and even before the fall of Saddam 57% of Greeks answered "neither" when asked which country was more democratic, the U.S. or Iraq.

Sowing the seeds of anti-Americanism by discrediting the American president was one of the main tasks of the Soviet-bloc intelligence community during the years I worked at its top levels. This same strategy is at work today, but it is regarded as bad manners to point out the Soviet parallels. For communists, only the leader counted, no matter the country, friend or foe. At home, they deified their own ruler--as to a certain extent still holds true in Russia. Abroad, they asserted that a fish starts smelling from the head, and they did everything in their power to make the head of the Free World stink

The communist effort to generate hatred for the American president began soon after President Truman set up NATO and propelled the three Western occupation forces to unite their zones to form a new West German nation. We were tasked to take advantage of the reawakened patriotic feelings stirring in the European countries that had been subjugated by the Nazis, in order to shift their hatred for Hitler over into hatred for Truman--the leader of the new "occupation power." Western Europe was still grateful to the U.S. for having restored its freedom, but it had strong leftist movements that we secretly financed. They were like putty in our hands.

The European leftists, like any totalitarians, needed a tangible enemy, and we gave them one. In no time they began beating their drums decrying President Truman as the "butcher of Hiroshima." We went on to spend many years and many billions of dollars disparaging subsequent presidents: Eisenhower as a war-mongering "shark" run by the military-industrial complex, Johnson as a mafia boss who had bumped off his predecessor, Nixon as a petty tyrant, Ford as a dimwitted football player and Jimmy Carter as a bumbling peanut farmer. In 1978, when I left Romania for good, the bloc intelligence community had already collected 700 million signatures on a "Yankees-Go-Home" petition, at the same time launching the slogan "Europe for the Europeans."

During the Vietnam War we spread vitriolic stories around the world, pretending that America's presidents sent Genghis Khan-style barbarian soldiers to Vietnam who raped at random, taped electrical wires to human genitals, cut off limbs, blew up bodies and razed entire villages. Those weren't facts. They were our tales, but some seven million Americans ended up being convinced their own president, not communism, was the enemy. As Yuri Andropov, who conceived this dezinformatsiya war against the U.S., used to tell me, people are more willing to believe smut than holiness.

The final goal of our anti-American offensive was to discourage the U.S. from protecting the world against communist terrorism and expansion. Sadly, we succeeded. After U.S. forces precipitously pulled out of Vietnam, the victorious communists massacred some two million people in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Another million tried to escape, but many died in the attempt. This tragedy also created a credibility gap between America and the rest of the world, damaged the cohesion of American foreign policy, and poisoned domestic debate in the U.S.

Unfortunately, partisans today have taken a page from the old Soviet playbook. At the 2004 Democratic National Convention, for example, Bush critics continued our mud-slinging at America's commander in chief. One speaker, Martin O'Malley, now governor of Maryland, had earlier in the summer stated he was more worried about the actions of the Bush administration than about al Qaeda. On another occasion, retired four-star general Wesley Clark gave Michael Moore a platform to denounce the American commander in chief as a "deserter." And visitors to the national chairman of the Democratic Party had to step across a doormat depicting the American president surrounded by the words, "Give Bush the Boot."

Competition is indeed the engine that has driven the American dream forward, but unity in time of war has made America the leader of the world. During World War II, 405,399 Americans died to defeat Nazism, but their country of immigrants remained sturdily united. The U.S. held national elections during the war, but those running for office entertained no thought of damaging America's international prestige in their quest for personal victory. Republican challenger Thomas Dewey declined to criticize President Roosevelt's war policy. At the end of that war, a united America rebuilt its vanquished enemies. It took seven years to turn Nazi Germany and imperial Japan into democracies, but that effort generated an unprecedented technological explosion and 50 years of unmatched prosperity for us all.

Now we are again at war. It is not the president's war. It is America's war, authorized by 296 House members and 76 senators. I do not intend to join the armchair experts on the Iraq war. I do not know how we should handle this war, and they don't know either. But I do know that if America's political leaders, Democrat and Republican, join together as they did during World War II, America will win. Otherwise, terrorism will win. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi predicted just before being killed: "We fight today in Iraq, tomorrow in the land of the Holy Places, and after there in the West."

On July 28, I celebrated 29 years since President Carter signed off on my request for political asylum, and I am still tremendously proud that the leader of the Free World granted me my freedom. During these years I have lived here under five presidents--some better than others--but I have always felt that I was living in paradise. My American citizenship has given me a feeling of pride, hope and security that is surpassed only by the joy of simply being alive. There are millions of other immigrants who are equally proud that they restarted their lives from scratch in order to be in this magnanimous country. I appeal to them to help keep our beloved America united and honorable. We may not be able to change the habits of our current political representatives, but we may be able to introduce healthy new blood into the U.S. Congress.

For once, the communists got it right. It is America's leader that counts. Let's return to the traditions of presidents who accepted nothing short of unconditional surrender from our deadly enemies. Let's vote next year for people who believe in America's future, not for the ones who live in the Cold War past.

Lt. Gen. Pacepa is the highest-ranking intelligence official ever to have defected from the Soviet bloc. His new book, "Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Soviet KGB, and the Kennedy Assassination" (Ivan R. Dee) will be published in November.