Bobzhuman

Col. Mike Walker (USMC retired) provides an article
written by BGen Dave Reist

Anbar: Feb 06-Feb 07
Moving the Ball down the Field
Focus on Economics, Governance, & Tribal engagement


Of late, Al Anbar province has been touted as the model for how to quell the dilemma faced in Iraq. As the surge is unfolding, Anbar is referred to as “The place where it worked” and some feel copying Anbar successes would mean success in Baghdad – and the rest of Iraq. This missive is intended to put into perspective what was done from Feb 06 through Feb 07 (and before that) that could have laid some of the foundation that has resulted in the successes currently enjoyed in Al Anbar province that II MEF is exploiting superbly. This piece will not serve as a template of “How to do it everywhere else in Iraq.” That caution is offered up front as the complexities of time, situation, culture throughout the country, and so many other variables make a “Recipe for success” an over-simplification for an extremely complex problem. It is safe to say that lessons learned in ANY counterinsurgency are applicable in bits & pieces, but to take one recipe in total is imprudent. One last qualifier, I will not focus on the tactical battles. The security LOO is crucial and a certain level of security is paramount for progress in a counterinsurgency.

Names will not be used as some events are still unfolding and mentioning Iraqis could endanger them.

On the Waterfront

In looking back at how Anbar has unfolded, I can’t help but recall the celluloid classic of 1953 entitled “On the Waterfront.” In this film, Johnny Friendly (played by Lee J. Cobb) has a tight grip over the waterfront – he controls who works, who doesn’t work, he gets his cut, he twists arms and breaks heads when needed, etc – in sum, total corruption maintained by murder and intimidation. The film starts with the murder of Joey Doyle. Terry Malloy (played by Marlon Brando) unwittingly assists in luring Joey to the roof the night before he was to testify against Johnny Friendly. Friendly’s thugs kill him by throwing him off the roof. Terry Malloy befriends Joey’s sister Edie (played by Eva Marie Saint) and she starts getting him to see the corruption. In addition, a local priest, Father Barry (played by Karl Malden), works to get Terry to testify against Johnny Friendly, and convinces him that the thugs are really hurting the workers and the docks, not helping them. Father Barry invites Terry to a meeting at a local church that is broken up as Johnny’s thugs surround the church and beat the attendees with baseball bats. Father Barry points out that Johnny Friendly will eventually kill anyone in his way, and this point is shown when Johnny Friendly kills Terry’s brother Charlie (played by Rod Steiger) who works for Johnny Friendly. Terry finds his brother murdered, hanging by longshoreman hooks after Charlie could not sway Terry (his own brother) not to testify against Johnny Friendly – murder to intimidate. This event did not intimidate Terry, but rather cemented his will against Johnny Friendly and he boldly testified and then went to the docks and took a beating. He lived, served as the lone wolf willing to stand up amongst sheep, and the sheep followed his lead and Johnny Friendly was finished. I’ll let you draw the parallels as the story of Anbar unfolds.

Thoughts up-front:

- We are playing 3 level chess, not checkers. Iraq is complicated.
- We can’t afford to loose in Iraq.
- We have to ask who is “driving” in Iraq. We have an Ambassador, an MNFI Commander, and a legitimately elected Government. Think unity of effort here.
- It’s not about money, it’s all about money. It’s always about money. There are other factors that contribute, but remember – MONEY.
- Differentiate between Insurgency and Resistance, because Iraqi’s do. Resistance fighters are those who do not want us in their backyard. Insurgents are the die-hard folks who need to be killed. AQI = Insurgents. This differentiation is not germane today (Aug 07) as any “resistance” is advertised by the local tribes as affiliation with AQI.
- If you ever hear someone say “This is the solution” or “Just do that” – run away from them. They do not understand the complexities of the situation – they are checker players. People who write books about the books they’ve read or repeat thoughts from other people are not who we need here.
- Cultural sensitivities are important. We spend a lot of time on this. We should continue to do so. BUT, if you are rude in America you will be rude in Iraq – just be a decent human being and it goes a long way.
- Perceptions of Anbar from Baghdad and vice versa. Anbar sees Baghdad as Shia led, Iran backed/controlled. Baghdad sees Anbar as those former Sunni’s who used to be in control and now it is our turn (maybe some payback here).
- Shame & Honor (this point is taken from a retired Army Officer & from Judith Miller in “God has Ninety-Nine Names”): Hearts and minds is over-used and it is more important to understand the dynamics of shame & honor. This is extremely complex, an antithesis of western culture, and goes to the heart of tribalism and understanding how things are done and why.
- Who is the real Sheik? If you ask anyone if they are a Sheik, they will probably say yes, at some level. Sheik is odd term that could imply a no-kidding tribal Sheik, a Sheik because of wealth, a Sheik because Saddam made Sheik’s to undermine the tribal influence in Anbar, etc. If you are ever in the room together and ask who the real Sheik is though, they all know.
- Sherman stated “War is cruelty. There’s no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.” Are we cruel enough for this war?

Looking Forward through the past: February 2004

I MEF entered Anbar province relieving the 82nd Airborne Division. Because Marines had a greater number of forces to apply against the problem, they were able to place forces where the 82nd could not. This is not a “Marines vs. Army” statement, just a statement of shear numbers and how a US Army Division is structured compared to a MAGTF (the surge in placing more troops on the ground is aimed at the same resultant). In doing so, the forces get into areas in which the enemy had enjoyed total freedom of action. This freedom translates into the ability to effect the local population and sway matters their way. The introduction of additional troops resulted in the insurgent grip being threatened, and increased casualties resulted (as happened in the surge).

CPA guidelines resulted in some things that negatively impacted Anbar. First, de-baathification resulted in many former Iraqi Army being out of work. As much of the leadership in Saddam’s Army was Sunni, many Anbari’s now had no job. Looking for employment was virtually impossible, and these former unemployed were prime candidates for the insurgency to sway to become resistance fighters. Also, throughout Iraq state owned enterprises (SOEs) were opened to private investment that never materialized and these SOEs stagnated. Result: More unemployment (or workers not receiving their full pay as the central Government continued to make partial payment to workers) that added to discontent.

Amidst all of the above, a NGO conference was held in Amman in Mar 2004 that looked at revitalization of Anbar. The MEF had LNOs in Amman and this conference was seen as a positive sign so the following month the MEF supported a conference that brought together businessmen – the embryonic Al Anbar Business Association (ABA) was formed. Key to this meeting was support from both Jordanian and Iraqi government ministries existed. A follow-on conference in Bahrain was held and MEF leadership at the highest levels attended. The signal was there were options to kinetics, and if security could be brokered, advances may occur. It is important to realize all this occurred after four US contractor bodies were hung in Fallujah. As Fallujah fell farther into dis-repair, a fall business conference in Dubai was planned that had 200 Anbar businessmen ready to attend. In November, the battle for Fallujah occurred and the Dubai business exchange was cancelled.

It must be noted that tribal engagement had occurred before the ground war and prior to Jan 06 with engagement taking place at various levels and in varying areas throughout Anbar. The point here is engagement takes time.

II MEF’s time in Anbar

II MEF was faced with conducting elections and operations in the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV). The elections piece was huge and it took a Herculean effort. A key point to mention is the Sunni’s boycotted the election and missed an opportunity to influence the action to adequately represent their party (or tribe) at the provincial level and in Baghdad. Hence, the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) had the preponderance of the seats in the Anbar Provincial Council. This translated into the IIP determining who the Governor was, and Governor Mamoun was placed in the Governor’s chair – and remains today.

I MEF had fought Fallujah in November 04 and squeezed the insurgents out. II MEF chased the insurgents up the WERV throughout 05, all the way to Al Qaim. Al Qaim is crucial though, because it was the first effort that witnessed US and tribal forces working together to oust the insurgents that resulted in subsequent police recruitment. This is the model of integration of capabilities. The insurgency has attempted to creep back into Al Qaim, but the security that has come with a permanent CF presence, coupled with the tribal buy-in to keep the insurgents out has been the key to keeping them out. Police recruiting increased immediately after the insurgents were pushed out of Al Qaim. This is what is currently happening in Ramadi (started in summer 06 and is being championed today) that is being heralded as a ground-breaking effort: II MEF established the model in 05. In the spring of 2006, in the small town of Baghdadi (north of Hit), the same thing happened as local forces pushed against the insurgents. Police recruitment soared and men from that area were placed in formal training. This is another example of “A model” that worked before the Ramadi Awakening (to be discussed).

Also critical was a meeting held 29 Nov 05. Many key Sheiks, Iman’s, and leaders came together in Ramadi. The purpose of the meeting was to gather the key players and simply determine what could be done by working together. As the insurgents had been decimated in Fallujah, then chased up the WERV, they were making their way to Ramadi and they used this meeting to ID targets for murder to intimidate. From Dec 05 to March 06, insurgents selectively murdered approximately 10 influential Iraqi’s in Ramadi that forced all others in Ramadi to go underground. Insurgents had a grip on the city that was tightening, and the M&I campaign accelerated that grip. It also forced any progress that was started to happen in Governance to wane, and quickly.

I MEF (Fwd) arrival in theater

Prior to deploying, I MEF (Fwd) held an Economic and Governance Conference in Camp Pendleton that brought together an eclectic group. The purpose of the conference was to look at what could be done in these “Lines of Operation” (LOOs) and develop a plan. MNFI, MNCI, Iraqi ministry, academia, OSD, independent businessmen, USAID, Department of State, and more attended and it was quickly realized the issue was complex and required a long term approach. No false pretenses were arrived at and a “Quick win” was out of the picture. It was readily apparent that sustained, dedicated operations in these LOOs that would be required in order to make a difference – and as stated before, security was paramount. Sponsored (and attended) by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation Agency), it became readily apparent that jobs and productivity were paramount to an Anbar solution. While it was clear that there were a lot of challenges to be overcome, there would also be a lot of resources to draw upon as Anbar is loaded with raw materials: oil, gas, bauxite, agriculture, etc.

Arriving in theater, the M&I campaign had served its purpose. Ramadi was spiraling downhill, but Fallujah was slowly improving and Al Qaim was quietly the “Jewel” of the province. We wanted to “Meet the Sheiks” but the local ones would not come forward and many had fled to Amman. Amman offered safety for those who could afford to relocate and is a traditional hub for business as well as a town that many Sunni’s in Anbar had relations or dual households. It is estimated that somewhere between 500K to 1 Million Anbari’s have taken residence in Amman for a variety of reasons. I MEF (Fwd) placed an LNO in Amman. His arrival caught the attention of the Anbari’s and they asked, “The Marines are back and what do they want?”

It is important to emphasize that limited dollars was available at this point – both from the Iraqi Government and the US Government. Iraqi funding was caught in the tight grip of a non-functioning government (either intentionally or unintentionally) and US funding (in the form of CERP) was not available in adequate amounts because the budget had not been passed. CERP funding did not become tangible until July 2006. This lack of funding resulted in the inability to empower the provincial government to hire contractors, reward locals, and in general make progress.

Death of a Sheikh

In March 2006, a prominent Sheik died unexpectedly while undergoing surgery in France. He was from a large tribe in Anbar and he had been outside Anbar for years as his business was run from Amman, but his tribe was still prominent. The wake (a four night affair) would be held in Jordan and we received notification from civilians (who had attended our Econ/Gov conference) to attend the wake – it is the right thing to do. Approval was granted and this opened more gates than we’ll ever know. By simply being at this funeral, it showed respect and demonstrated that the Marines where serious about talking with the Sheiks. From this participation, 75 businessmen from Fallujah agreed to come to Amman in May and meet with businessmen from the region – some US businessmen attended. Supported by DUSD (BTA), this conference was intended to simply put businessmen together in the same room. We had been looking to engage with the “Top tier sheiks” and they were not to be found, so we jumped on this opportunity. The conference did exactly what we wanted, and while at this conference, the “Top Tier Sheiks” quietly approached us and asked if we were interested in meeting with them. In retrospect, they found us, we did not find them. Later in May, again with the support of DUSD (BTA) a conference was held with the “Top tier Sheiks” and this continued to keep the ball rolling. Two issues here: In defining the Top tier Sheiks, it is not implied that all the Sheiks/tribes were represented. They made the guest list and defining who is “Top tier” is contentious. Second, the gathering of these “Top tier” resulted in some friction that created some chasms. It was viewed that meeting and talking was better than non-meeting and we were sure that even if someone was omitted, they were “In the know.”

Our LNO in Amman continued the ball rolling. In meeting the Top tier Sheiks; the intent was to pursue numerous initiatives. Encouraging the Sheiks to return to Anbar was key, as this would send a signal that normalcy was returning to the province. We encouraged the Iman’s to attempt to influence the messages coming from the mosques on Friday. We did not want to attempt to shape the message, we simply asked it not be anti-coalition or inflammatory. We also asked to influence the action against the insurgents – stated another way, assist in getting them out of Anbar as it was to their benefit to rid their homeland of this problem. We asked them to invest in the province. All of these were viewed as long term.

Economics: Task Force for Business and Stability Operations – Iraq (TF-BSO)

Unemployment in Iraq is high, by any standard. Figures from USAID list unemployment and underemployment at around 55%. Without work, Iraq is a recruiting haven for insurgents. DUSD Paul Brinkley had visited Iraq several times and as his perspective evolved, at the urging of then MNCI Commander (LTG Chiarelli) and at the direction of Deputy Secretary of Defense England, TF-BSO was formed. He focused on economic revitalization of Iraq. The philosophy is simple: Jobs create fewer personnel on the street who can be co-opted by insurgents and there is a feeling of honor again in having a job and being a productive Iraqi. This involved two key elements: restoring state-owned enterprises (SOEs, i.e., factories) thus reestablishing business connections between sources of demand and potential Iraqi factories and linking Iraqi industry to the global economy. An assessment of dormant or partially running factories has been conducted and coordination with the Iraqi ministries and MNFI in attempting to get as many factories back on line as possible is underway. Also, senior executives from American and international industry have been brought to Iraq to provide support for Iraqi revitalization. This is the deep fight, seeds need to be planted, and a security posture needs to allow this to unfold.

The efforts of the TF are needed and are a good primer. It has been proffered by some that DoD needs to get out of this initiative and commercial business involvement is needed for this effort to truly gain traction.

The Awakening in Ramadi

In late summer/early fall of 2006, a movement by a Sheik arose. Simply stated, a Sheik banded together with a few other Sheiks, banded with coalition forces, and fought the insurgents. They also encouraged the “Sons of Anbar” to join the police. Both of these measures were huge. First, in the tribes joining the fight against the insurgents it created a scenario in which the local population no longer allowed the insurgents safe havens. The growth of the police put locals on the beat, and their intelligence, as well as Sunni’s now seeing Sunni’s in their neighborhoods was a tremendous plus. Up to this point in Ramadi, few police were being recruited – some, but not enough to make a difference. Stated another way: Men would not join the police in adequate numbers until the Sheiks allowed it to happen.

In Anbar there are approximately 88 tribes that fall under the Dulaymi Federation, of which 15-18 are considered prominent tribes. The Sheik who founded the Awakening was not from one of the prominent tribes. He was not the Sheik of his tribe. The dynamics of how he rose to power and who joined him (and who didn’t join him) are fascinating, in some cases a matter of opinion, and honestly to all Americans and most Iraqi’s not completely known. This topic could be a complete paper itself, but suffice it to say the Awakening movement served the causes of the coalition forces.

The challenge in dealing with the Awakening was to get the tribal entities to work in coordination with the existing Anbar Government to maximize progress via unity of effort in Anbar. This was a delicate matter because the Awakening had not participated in the election process and did not have representation on the Provincial Council. As their movement came to the forefront, they thought they should have a greater say in the governance process, and they had already established a back door relationship with the highest levels of Government in Baghdad. Some felt the Awakening should have the lead in governing Anbar as they were having the greatest impact (remember here successes in Al Qaim and Fallujah counters this). Others felt elections should be held as soon as possible as to better provide a more accurate representation of Anbar Province within the Provincial Council – this would take a mandate from the Central government, and one that was barely functioning in most opinions. The Governor was routinely making weekly trips to Baghdad and lobbying the Iraqi Government. This was happening at the same time the Awakening was dealing with Malaki and he “authorized” the existence of units (that were police like) but did not appropriate for them. What this created was the emergence of forces under the Awakening not trained through any ISF formal structure but operating in Ramadi. Some saw this as the potential to be viewed as a militia – a dangerous concept as Sadr’s militia was being targeted by the coalition forces. Throughout the fall of 2006, the Awakening, the Provincial Council, and the Governor met on numerous occasions, worked matters, and the Awakening forces were integrated into formalized training. The Awakening was also given seats (by appointment) in the Provincial Council. This unity of effort in fighting the insurgents, communicating with Baghdad, and speaking with a unified voice was huge.

Tipping Point

Many have said Anbar is at a tipping. It may be and if so, why. Many factors contribute to this:
- Tribal unity against the insurgents: Huge point
- Competency of ISF: This includes police, army, and border forces, and placing qualified advisors is the key. Two points here: Police are more effective than the Army in curbing the insurgency (Army was mainly Shia and Sunni’s of Anbar did not receive Army forces well – and vice versa as Shia Army at times abused the Sunni population) and closing the border was seen as a critical measure to control what was coming into Iraq (the Iraqi’s have a saying “Do not try to dust the house with the windows open).
- Murder & Intimidation: The more the insurgents use this tactic, the more they drive the local population to embrace the coalition message. On the other hand, the coalition forces must watch how heavy handed they are, for fear of driving the local population towards the insurgents.
- Economic growth: Employment offers an alternative to accepting financial rewards from insurgents.
- National Government support: If Baghdad supports Anbar, what a plus this would be. This support needs to come in a cash flow that supports Anbar programs and promotes growth. However, the Central Government needs to demonstrate its commitment to providing for the welfare of Anbar Province not just through the budget, but in other areas such as fuel and power allocation.
- PRT proficiency: The embedded PRTs at the RCT/BCT level are proving effective and a totally flushed out PRT and the MNF-W level makes a huge difference. It is unfortunate it took this long for this to come to fruition.
- Foreign Investment: This would have tremendous impact as it would show the environment supports investment and confidence would soar. This is feasible, but the mechanism to make it happen is delicate. Again, this is an area where the Central Government has an opportunity to help by passing investment laws that will be attractive to foreign investors.
- Crime: At this point it is hard to differentiate between what is criminal and what is insurgent activity. Also, with all the money going towards projects and possible growth, this attracts nefarious people. As much effort that goes into defeating the insurgency should go towards monitoring criminal activity IOT prevent money being squandered.
- Sunni tolerance of the insurgency wanes: This is huge.

Final thoughts

We need the elements of National Power present in Iraq and we need them integrated. We need Treasury, Commerce, Justice, State, etc all in Iraq maximizing the areas that they can lend a hand too. Key here is unity of effort. When the above agencies send representatives, we need first-string players, not representatives.

Two mandatory books to read are the Old Testament because we are all sons of Abraham and the history of the Peloponnesian Wars by Thucydides as war is timeless.

Americans are arrogant or perceived as arrogant. This will not change, realize it, and simply be nice. You will never be able to get the “US stink” off you.

Democracy is a great concept but to strive for democracy in Iraq is a bridge too far (after all, the US is a Republic and arguably the most stable Government in the area is a Monarchy (Jordan)). We need to watch how we use this word.

Reservists are key. The tool set brought to the table by our reservists are crucial and their skills are priceless when working economic and governance issues. Shop for those skills.

Iran: The Sunni’s mantra was Iran is the problem. It was not until the State of the Union address in January 2007 that a public remark was first made against Iran. When asking the Sheiks about this statement, they responded, “That was very good and what will be said next?” Most were kind in not saying “What took you so long?” -- although some did.

Process vs Result: Process is important, but get a result. If your process is good you will get a result. If you do not get a result, but want to cling to process improvement and refinement, you risk spinning in a circle – and in war this is unacceptable. To use a sports analogy, when you leave the field, if you do not have more points on the scoreboard than the other guy, you lose. Talking about the nice block during the 3rd quarter (process) is nice but how many points are on the board (result) and did you win the game?

Economic initiatives: Before getting into specifics, the overarching thought in elements below is to have gangsters of capitalism replace gangsters. Security will be enhanced by businessmen protecting their assets. The creation of jobs will limit the population for the insurgents to draw from and hopefully create an environment that the people of the Iraq chose peace, prosperity, and economic growth over war. This means they keep the insurgents out.

The Anbar telecommunications capability is broke. It consisted of in-ground cooper lines to begin with that had no potential to support the province. The insurgents demolished what existed. Cell phone capability was minimal, and insurgents destroyed cell phone towers that cut that capability. Recently, re-establishment of cell phone towers has re-established cell phone capability in portions of the province. What the province needs is wireless local loop (WLL). WLL offers both voice and data capability (cell phone does not allow for data). Data would allow businessmen to operate on the internet – this is HUGE. It is totally doable, is minimal cost, and has a huge profit margin for whoever invests. There are some concerns, but WLL has been the choice in virtually every country that has to build from the ground up and Anbar is a prime candidate.

Anbar has tremendous gas & oil reserves. The people that need to know about this already know, and it is as simple (and complex) as the central government sorting out the business laws that allow for foreign investment. Foreign investment is a must because of the dollar value and capabilities required to fully exploit these raw materials. The Shia’s in Baghdad are well aware of the future monetary potential of Anbar gas & oil reserves and this is a large stumbling block in determining legislation for how the profit is divided.

Electrical power is the backbone of industry and Anbar (and most of Iraq) has a fragile skeletal system. It is antiquated, is in disrepair, is an easy target, and is being stressed at the same time it is being improved. This is a long term effort and crucial to economic growth as industry needs consistent power, not 12 hours a day. Large generators are an initial solution, but building additional dams, solar/wind power, etc all will add to solving this crucial problem.

Agriculture: It is estimated that only 20% of the capacity of farming in Anbar is being tapped. The potential is endless and not just farming. Crops are just the beginning and even just maximizing this would not only create jobs but allow Iraq to feed itself. Jobs created in harvesting, packaging, distribution, sales, etc would be huge. Agricultural centers (Co-Ops) that would branch into livestock would only add to the boom.

Microfinance loans: This initiative will allow the smaller businessman to engage. Economic growth needs both a top down and bottom up approach. This program is just getting off the ground and should have happened years ago but did not for a variety of reasons.

A credible banking system is needed. There is interest in making this happen.

Iraqi Railroad (IRR): A track that enabled commerce to be conducted all the way to the Al Qaim was opened in 2006. This enhances distribution and the transport of any goods and shows confidence that a sense of normalcy is returning. More track repair is ongoing and the potential for passenger movement (which was done in the past) is being considered again.

The number of opportunities to stimulate economic growth are endless in Anbar. It is truly a chicken-and-egg scenario when dealing with economic growth and security: Which comes first? An Iraqi general once stated, “A Hand Alone Cannot Clap.” By this he meant that the combination of economics and security will feed each other and create the endstate. Iraqi’s are innovative businessmen and they are primed to make money (remember, it’s all about money). Even if the security posture is totally set, without jobs (other than ISF) the country will stagnate.

Conclusion

Positive progress in Anbar has been the result of iterative, continual, and consistent actions by coalition forces. Each MEF has pushed the ball down the field after the hand off from their predecessors. Security actions (AL FAJR, RIVERGATE, etc) have gone into areas, maintained a presence within the town and their people, built up the IP and the IA, and progress has resulted. Economic and Governance initiatives have been integrated with the Security LOO and this synergy in the LOOs has produced the most dynamic result. The challenges and opportunities need to be assessed daily to make needed course corrections and closely watch the dynamics of tribalism within Anbar. Results in Anbar and tribalism reverberate well beyond the Anbar borders and have impacts throughout the entire Middle East – this is evident today with the success in Anbar. There are massive amounts of money at play at this juncture and power and long-term posturing is a daily occurrence. Marines have done a good job of remaining consistent while adapting to opportunities; this must continue. What comes next? How are opportunities exploited?