Very interesting... I've probably done 5-6 paintings of Custer and always had that.... "but, please General Custer, I don't want to go!" running through my head. I see him and his mission quite differently now. I have visited the "Battle Field" and viewed the re-enactment in Harden, MT.
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The Little Bighorn and Custer Revisited
Col Mike Walker, USMC (retired)
All,
As a change of pace, a little historical "nonpolitical/national security" food for thought.
When I grew up, the Errol Flynn "They Died With Their Boots On" Custer was definitely passé. In its stead, Custer was treated as a one-dimensional... well… idiot, clown, buffoon, etc. More a caricature than a human.
I have not gone back to Errol's version but after studying Custer in the Civil War, he was not the "horse's behind" that I had come to accept.
The Little Bighorn and Custer Revisited
A. THE FACTS
I. Where Are They?
In June 1876, none of the Army commanders knew precisely where Sitting Bull was located. As they conferred at the confluence of the Yellowstone and Rosebud Rivers, scouting parties were sent out. No one found Sitting Bull but the scouts were able to determine where he was not and where he had been.
Based on that information, the Generals knew he had to be somewhere south of the Yellowstone and between the Rosebud and Big Horn/Little Bighorn Rivers.
Unlike the simplistic legend that Custer was an “unguided missile,” Terry gave Custer written orders just before he struck out at noon on 22 June. Given the lack of accurate intelligence, Terry informed Custer “it is of course, impossible to give you definite instructions.”
Terry had ordered Gibbons to advance west along the Yellowstone to the Big Horn River and then south along that river until meeting the Little Bighorn River and Custer.
Custer was to drive south down the Rosebud to the location of Sitting Bull’s abandoned Sun Dance campsite and near the headwaters of the Tongue River, locate Sitting Bull’s trail as best he could and follow it westwardly to the Little Bighorn River and then north to meet Gibbons.
Terry then wrote: “It is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Bighorn, may be so nearly inclosed [sic] by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.”
Terry also gave Custer leeway to operate in that he would “not impose on you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy.” There were no written directives telling Custer to wait for Gibbons or not to attack until ordered so.
[As an aside, during the earlier scouting to find Siting Bull, a few Gatling guns had been brought along. They were unwieldy and easily stuck and proved so cumbersome that the cavalry lost heir ability to maneuver and just sat around waiting for the crews to get the Gatling guns on the move again. The cavalrymen wanted nothing to do with them and afterwards they were sent to the various unit pack trains, to include those of the 7th Cavalry.]
II. The fiercely independent Sioux warrior culture changed everything
From afar, Custer’s scouts had spotted the smoke and dust signature of Sitting Bull’s camp on 24 June but it was late afternoon and Custer did arrive at the look out point until near dusk and could not see the signs in the fading visibility. He knew there was a camp but did not realize just how big. Here again, past experience worked against Custer.
Not just Custer but Sheridan and most all the veteran Indian fighters knew that it was not possible to keep a large encampment for long as the thousands of horses would soon exhaust the nearby grasses forcing movement and even with a fresh supply of river water, the natural accumulation of waste created immediate hygiene problems.
As a result, large camps like Sitting Bull’s only lasted a few days before they broke up into smaller groups. Having uncovered the remains of the massive Sun Dance camp by the Rosebud, it was assumed that the Sioux and others were likely moving in two or more groups.
The assumption was wrong; Sitting Bull still retained a huge single force of warriors on the Little Bighorn. At that day’s end on 24 June, veteran scout Mitch Bouyer told Custer the signs indicated the largest camp he had ever seen. Bouyer was relatively new to working with Custer having previously served with the 2nd Cavalry and apparently Custer did not have enough confidence in Bouyer to act based solely on the scout’s word.
Bouyer wound up with the 7th Cavalry because Custer, who traditionally used Ree scouts, needed a Crow speaker to communicate with the Crow scout-guides assigned to him by Terry for the campaign. [Note: scouts were experts at reconnaissance while guides knew the local terrain, it was boon to have the Crow who could perform both jobs, although the language barrier proved problematic]
After finding Sitting Bull, Custer’s original plan was to go to ground, remain hidden and rest for one day and then fix and attack Sitting Bull’s camp on 26 June.
Earlier on 24 June, however, the 7th Cavalry and a small band of Sioux spotted each other. Having no interest in returning after opting to leave Sitting Bull’s camp and having avoided the 7th Cavalry, the band continued on their way. Such was the Sioux warrior way.
The cavalrymen saw it differently. Knowing they had been discovered, they believed the band would warn the others of the regiment’s presence and time was of essence. Custer decided to move up the attack to the following day.
Had Custer attacked on 26 June as originally planned, he would have been able to scout out the camp on the 25th and obtained a much more accurate picture of the enemy. Additionally, Gibbon’s forces would have been a day closer and it should be recalled that his column reached the Little Bighorn battlefield early on 27 June.
That chance 24 June encounter with the Sioux band changed everything.
III. The Battle Formation and Opening Maneuver of the 7th Cavalry on 25 June
Much has been written about the manner in which Custer divided his forces and most of it derogatory. That criticism is too simplistic.
US Army Cavalry regiments in 1876 were organized into in companies (not troops) with no formal battalion structure. Battalions (not squadrons) were, however, routinely used on an ad hoc basis, in peacetime for administrative purposes and in wartime for battle.
On 25 June, Custer had twelve companies of cavalry, an armed pack train and a large contingent of scouts and guides. He divided the regiment into four three-company battalions under Yates, Keogh, Benteen and Reno.
Custer was stickler for readiness and the last company to be fully saddled was assigned to guard the pack train. On that morning, Yates, who had been with Custer since the Battle of Gettysburg, would only have two companies as the tardy Co. B under Lt. McDougall went with the packs. McDougall was, nonetheless, a solid combat commander.
[A short note on the battalion commanders (officially three captains and a major): Like Captain Yates who had been promoted to brevet Lt. Colonel for bravery at Gettysburg, all had distinguished Civil War records: Major Reno had risen to become a Cavalry Division chief-of-staff in the war with the brevet rank of Brig. General, Captain Benteen was a Colonel of Volunteers and regimental commander by 1865 while Captain Keogh distinguished himself with Buford’s cavalry at Gettysburg and ended the war a brevet Lt. Col.]
Because of the uncertainty over the location and number of camps, Terry had ordered Custer to constantly guard his left flank. The fear was that the 7th Cavalry might reach the Little Bighorn River to north – not the south - of Sitting Bull’s Camp.
In other words, there was a concern that Sitting Bull might not be trapped between Custer and Gibbons. Another concern was that Custer and Gibbons would converge on one camp to the north and then be surprised by an attack from second camp to the south (behind) Custer on the Little Bighorn.
On the morning of 25 June, the flank guard duty fell on Benteen who was told to sweep to the left (south) and make sure there were no hostile forces on that flank. Custer advanced with the three battalions of eight companies along with most of the scouts towards Sitting Bull’s camp.
As is well known, enroute to Sitting Bull’s camp the regiment spotted a mounted party of warriors who quickly raced back towards the camp to the northwest. Custer told Reno to take his battalion and pursue them down the river into the camp. Custer would swing north several miles, fall on the camp by crossing the Little Bighorn River and join with Reno. As an added measure, he immediately dispatched a messenger to Benteen to collect the pack train and join the fight so the entire regiment would mass on Sitting Bull. In less than an hour the battle would be won.
Nothing of the kind ever happened.
B. The Hypothesis
No one who fought with the two battalions under Custer on 25 June survived to relate what happened. The Sioux and other Native American participants related their reminiscences of the battle with a cultural tradition that focused primarily on individual bravery. That provides an extremely vivid and detailed picture of the close combat. The Native American accounts also offer an accurate sequence of events for the “last stand” of the two Custer battalions.
However, even when combined with the US cavalry burial sites made at the time and detailed archeological records from the 1980s, the ability to turn the myth into a precise history of what occurred on 25 June 1876 remains elusive. Assessing the actions of the two 7th Cavalry battalions and their companies directly under Custer remains inaccessibly difficult, i.e. which units went where, at what time, under whom and most of all, why?
This author makes no claim to have uncovered the truth. What follows is the best hypothesis this author can posit given the imperfect number of “knowns.”
Much of what follows hinges on the testimony of one Sioux warrior, White Cow Bull.
Like all Sioux warriors, White Cow Bull earned his name through personal exploit, in his case by marksmanship both with a bow and arrow (by killing a bull at great distance) and with the rifle. On 25 June, White Bull Cow was with a Cheyenne warrior friend in the Cheyenne camp at the north end of Sitting Bull’s encampment.
Perhaps thirty minutes earlier, Reno had hit the Sioux at the camp’s south end and drew the bulk of the warriors towards him. At that moment, the Custer battalions rode down a ravine (Medicine Creek Coulee) and started to charge across the Little Bighorn into Sitting Bull’s camp. White Cow Bull rushed to fight, took aim at the foremost charging cavalrymen and fired at and hit a rider on a sorrel horse with four white stockings.
Only Custer rode such a horse. By some accounts the rider fell into the river. Regardless, two things quickly happened. The charge faltered and other cavalrymen rode to Custer and helped him back across the river, either by getting him remounted or guiding the horse and wounded (or possibly dead) rider away from the danger zone.
Why the now retreating battalions did not retrace their steps southwardly back towards Reno, Benteen and the armed pack train with McDougall’s company is not clear. Perhaps that part of the ravine was still crammed with tail end of the advancing 7th Cavalry and the head of column with a seriously wounded Custer had to take the route that led further north.
In any event, from that point forward it appears that the two Custer battalions were fully engaged in a fighting retreat that ended in their complete destruction.
Calhoun’s Company L of Keogh’s battalion established the first delay line at the high ground atop the ravine. The final V-shaped defensive stand closely followed the order of march after Reno left the regiment: At the far end (north) stood Custer with Yates battalion followed by Keogh and lastly Calhoun.
The puzzle is: Why did they stop?
Custer had led dozens of charges and skirmishes in Civil War; most comprising of forces much larger than the five companies he led at the Little Bighorn. Many battles went his way but as the Confederate cavalry often gave as good as they got, some went the way of the enemy.
Three things were consistent in these battles. First, Custer led from the front unlike many senior cavalry commanders in the war. Second, he never cultivated a strong second-in-command. On 25 June, Custer’s deputy 7th Cavalry commander was back at Fort Lincoln in the Dakotas. Third, Custer valued the lives of his men, when he got in a jam he personally led the rearguard until his command was out of harm’s way and able to regroup.
So what happened on 25 June?
Custer did not stay with the rearguard (Calhoun) nor did he order the battalions to ride hard and fast to get them away from Siting Bull’s camp as the “last stand” battlefield was only a few minutes ride from the encampment.
If Custer was in command then he never would have halted where his battalions did. It was totally out of character. It seems clear that Custer was out of the fight and without a strong second, the battalions lost their way making White Cow Bull’s claim very credible.
In that chaos, Calhoun, Custer’s brother-in-law, would have eagerly volunteered his company to try to stop the advancing Sioux to protect a wounded or dying Custer. That forced a weakened Keogh to mount a defense on poor ground between Calhoun and the “Last Stand Hill” defended by Yates with Tom Custer, the extraordinarily decorated brother.
It seems a plausible conclusion that the quick halt on the high ground above Sitting Bull’s camp was timed to provide the earliest perceived moment of safe respite to regroup a confused leaderless command.
It proved a fatal decision.
Finally, Benteen and Reno acted prudently. If Custer with five companies hit a deadly wall of fire at the village that forced a retreat then Reno with only three companies who initially faced the bulk of the warriors was in a hopeless position.
When Benteen got Custer’s message and drove north along the Little Bighorn, he first ran into Reno’s desperate defense. He had to come to Reno’s aid and when one company subsequently left to find Custer by following his trail towards the village, they were quickly beaten back.
How Many Are There?
The inescapable fact is that no US soldier had ever run into such an assemblage of skilled and determined Plains warriors.
The Indian Bureau estimated that Terry was facing about 500 warriors. Sheridan estimated 500-800. The rough math of era estimated that one lodge equated to a little over two warriors. The earlier Sun Dance site left traces of approximately 1,500 lodges and tipis. Given that a number of warriors had drifted away, like the party spotted on 24 June, Custer certainly faced over 1,000 well-armed professional combatants and more likely 1,500. This was an unprecedented number, a number none of the commanders believed possible.
Even accounting for those left to guard the camp and occupied fighting Reno and later Benteen, Custer with his 242 soldiers and scouts were confronted with an overwhelming force. There were simply too many rock solid warriors to handle. That, more than any other factor, sealed Custer’s fate.
Semper Fi,
Mike
