Understanding Terrorism by Islamic Extremists
Mike Walker, Col USMC (retired)
All,
The public discourse on terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists is often of limited value because their methods are so atypical of how most American’s think and act – a psychological “disconnect” that leads inevitably to misunderstanding the nature of the threat facing us as a nation.
One problem lies in terminology. The term “self-radicalized” is a meaningless statement of the obvious and plainly unhelpful. Perhaps only “collateral damage” is more harmful, a dishonest euphemism for the death of innocents.
In the end, “self-radicalization” is simply a specific example of self-actualization and conveys nothing of real use. Everyone is self-actuated as no one is coerced, for example, to become a doctor or lawyer. The decision to enter into teaching or fire fighting or the military is the result of self-actuation and every Islamic extremist terrorist, or pacifist for that matter, chose that path at some point.
Declaring someone as “self-radicalized” gets us virtually nowhere in understanding the threat as every radical Islamic terrorists is self-radicalized to one degree or another. That gets to heart of the matter, what can we conclude about the radical Islamic terrorists?
Actually, we can conclude quite a bit. First, as alluded to above, they operate along asymmetrical lines. They do not function within a “block and line “ organization chart, nor do they operate like a traditional guerilla movement. That does not mean that their form of asymmetrical warfare is not highly effective, in fact, that sense of unfamiliarity and strangeness is an asset.
Second, there are recognizable characteristics. Radical Islamic terrorists share both a belief in a perversely extreme form of Islam and a broadly common world-vision of a future that can only be realized through horrific violence.
The terrorists are unusually independent, as their actions require a deeply personal form of commitment. In other words, the radical Islamic terrorist often needs to identify the “what, when, where, and how” they can best help in winning the war and it is their responsibility to act without necessarily being asked or told.
This is nothing new. In the Marine Corps, making independent decisions based on understanding the “intent,” rather than being given explicit instructions, is a common practice and the ability to globally transmit an “intent” that eventually translated into a terrorist operation was what made Anwar Al-Awlaki such a deadly and effective al Qaeda operative.
That leads to the final point, radical Islamic extremists realize that one of the best tools to assist their fellow travelers is through social media and the internet – personal contact is valued and encouraged, if proper safeguards are taken, but not essential to success. These are not traits that only arise in the United States, for they were and are an Islamic terrorist’s modus operandi in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Maghreb, across the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere.
Semper Fi,
Mike
