From Mike Walker (retired USMC Colonel)
Several points about Somalia.
A. No one should consider a long-term “stabilization /nation building” operation for that unfortunate land. Why? A short “History of Somalia” may answer the question.
Historically, there were once a handful of thriving coastal city-states on the Somali shoreline, most notably Mogadishu, which brought peace, stability and wealth to the enclaved population. The hinterland, on the other hand, was always the home of decentralized nomadic clans living marginally above the subsistence level. But there has never been an historic nation of Somalia in recorded history.
The European (Italian, British, and French) powers colonized the region in the 19th century but there efforts had a minimal effect on creating a unified nation. The Italians poured in millions of dollars always with a losing result. The British basically maintained a “do no harm” policy. The coast was kept peaceful by leaving the nomads alone. They invested little or nothing with a similar expectation on any return. The French simply never left. They are still their today in their little corner of the region (Djibouti).
Perhaps because of its lack of perceived (real?) value, Somalia was one of the first Sub-Saharan African countries to gain independence from its colonial masters in 1960. It quickly reached the status quo of a failed state by the late 1970’s. It has remained much the same ever since.
If some one else wants to try to recreate the Somali city-state pockets of stability in a hope that it will tame the inland deserts, more power to them but now is not the time for the United States to consider such a risky undertaking.
B. Is this “piracy stuff” linked to the war on terror?
It is now acknowledged that the first two attacks by al Qaeda against the United States took place on 29 December 1992 in Yemen, home of Usama bin Laden. It was directed against US forces there preparing to participate in the Somalia humanitarian aid mission Operation Restore Hope.
This fact is brought to the fore for several reasons. First, we didn’t even know that al Qaeda existed at that point in time even though it had been operational for as long as four years. Perhaps that is because it was operating under front names such as the International Benevolence Foundation and the al Kifah Refugee Center.
Second, the same bases used by the pirates today were used then to smuggle weapons and al Qaeda operatives into Somalia from Yemen during Operation Restore Hope. At the very least the smugglers then and the pirates today are almost certainly from the same clans. It would not be surprising to discover they are the same groups and even have some of the same outlaw members from the 1990’s.
Third, there would not have been the level of sophistication in the Somali warlord forces during the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” battle in Mogadishu had it not been for al Qaeda and the Somali smugglers/pirates. The point is what is real and what we think is real about today’s piracy is not necessarily the same thing.
We underestimated the complexity of the situation then. We underestimated the resources available to our opponents then. We underestimated the true motives of our opponents then. We underestimated the emboldening consequences of being perceived as having been bested by our enemy.
Anyone who claims that the pirates are not connected in any meaningful degree to al Qadea is just wasting everyone’s time in a useless exercise of wishful thinking. The real question is how connected are they are now and how is the relationship evolving.
C. Economics 101
Getting the incentives right is the toughest part of any progressive economic policy. In the case of Somalia, it never worked out under the colonial powers. It never worked out under successive pro-Western or pro-Soviet governments in the Cold War. Hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign development aid never did the trick. Well if we couldn’t succeed then we certainly are doing a great job of setting Somalia up for further failure. Talk about a textbook example of creating the worst possible incentive. A few years ago, the Somali pirates were taking in a few million dollars. Last year, estimates are in $50 million range. This year, they look to reach $100M.
We failed in helping Somalia but we have done a grand job of turning them into huge criminal enterprise. Cheers! The silver lining is that the figures are just huge. If we really want to turn this around and get to the bottom of it we just need to follow the money.
And therein lies the rub. Clearly a few pennies make their way into the local community, but that is a distraction. Big bucks never stay in Somalia. So where are they? More importantly, do we have the guts to face the answer? I ask this because after the Oil-for-Food corruption/criminal operation, I doubt that some “power that be” in the international community really want anyone to get to the bottom of this operation. They would like to put it to bed with the killing of some hapless Somali pirates, if need be, and quickly change the subject.
If any fool thinks that these are just a few simple fishermen who have turned to piracy out of dire necessity then I have hedge fund for you to invest in. I believe Bernie Madoff is pulling it together using mortgage backed securities created by Fannie Mae. Even better, your investment is totally secure because it is protected by credit default swap derivatives from AIG Financial Products. Make checks payable to the Somali Benevolence Foundation.
D. What do we do next?
First, let us give President Obama high marks for handling this crisis. He adeptly avoided legitimatizing these guys by refusing to become personally engaged with them. He refused to be intimidated or enfeebled by the crimes of the pirates by choosing decisive action.
So what is next? We should seriously consider putting U.S. Marines on all U.S. flagged vessels sailing through the stretch of the Indian Ocean as an appropriate defensive step that applies only to the situation in Somalia. This can be done under the envelope of UNSCR 1816. Make this an overt move and state openly that the Marines and U.S. Navy in order to prevent, repress, and/or deter acts of piracy and armed robbery will use force.
That should create a nice little test of competing economic incentives, attack U.S. flagged vessels and die or go elsewhere to get rich.
Semper Fi,
Mike
