Wrong on Timetables
The Democratic Congress doesn't understand what is going on in Iraq.
by William Kristol & Frederick W. Kagan
04/02/2007, Weekly Standard, Volume 012, Issue 28

Let's give congressional Democrats the benefit of the doubt: Assume some of them earnestly think they're doing the right thing to insist on adding to the supplemental appropriation for the Iraq war benchmarks and timetables for withdrawal. Still, their own arguments--taken at face value--don't hold up.

Democrats in Congress have made three superficially plausible claims: (1) Benchmarks and timetables will "incentivize" the Maliki government to take necessary steps it would prefer to avoid. (2) We can gradually withdraw over the next year so as to step out of sectarian conflict in Iraq while still remaining to fight al Qaeda. (3) Defeat in Iraq is inevitable, so our primary goal really has to be to get out of there. But the situation in Iraq is moving rapidly away from the assumptions underlying these propositions, and their falseness is easier to show with each passing day.

(1) The Iraqi government will not act responsibly unless the imminent departure of American forces compels it to do so. Those who sincerely believe this argument were horrified by the president's decision in January to increase the American military presence in Iraq. It has now been more than ten weeks since that announcement--long enough to judge whether the Maliki government is more or less likely to behave well when U.S. support seems robust and reliable.

In fact, since January 11, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has permitted U.S. forces to sweep the major Shiite strongholds in Baghdad, including Sadr City, which he had ordered American troops away from during operations

in 2006. He has allowed U.S. forces to capture and kill senior leaders of Moktada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army--terrifying Sadr into fleeing to Iran. He fired the deputy health minister--one of Sadr's close allies--and turned a deaf ear to Sadr's complaints. He oversaw a clearing-out of the Interior Ministry, a Sadrist stronghold that was corrupting the Iraqi police. He has worked with coalition leaders to deploy all of the Iraqi Army units required by the Baghdad Security Plan. In perhaps the most dramatic move of all, Maliki visited Sunni sheikhs in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province and formerly the base of al Qaeda fighters and other Sunni Arab insurgents against his government. The visit was made possible because Anbar's sheikhs have turned against al Qaeda and are now reaching out to the government they had been fighting. Maliki is reaching back. U.S. strength has given him the confidence to take all these important steps.

(2) American forces would be able to fight al Qaeda at least as well, if not better, if they were not also engaged in a sectarian civil war in Iraq. The idea of separating the fight against al Qaeda from the sectarian fighting in Iraq is a delusion. Since early 2004, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has sought to plunge Iraq into sectarian civil war, so as to critically weaken the government, which is fighting it. AQI endeavors to clear Shiites out of mixed areas, terrorize local Sunnis into tolerating and supporting AQI, and thereby establish safe havens surrounded by innocent people it then dragoons into the struggle. Now, heartened by the U.S. commitment to stay, Sunni sheikhs in Anbar have turned on AQI. In response, AQI has begun to move toward Baghdad and mixed areas in Diyala, attempting to terrorize the locals and establish new bases in the resulting chaos. The enemy understands that chaos is al Qaeda's friend. The notion that we can pull our troops back into fortresses in a climate of chaos--but still move selectively against al Qaeda--is fanciful. There can be no hope of defeating or controlling al Qaeda in Iraq without controlling the sectarian violence that it spawns and relies upon.

(3) Isn't it too late? Even if we now have the right strategy and the right general, can we prevail? If there were no hope left, if the Iraqis were determined to wage full-scale civil war, if the Maliki government were weak or dominated by violent extremists, if Iran really controlled the Shiites in Iraq--if these things were true, then the new strategy would have borne no fruit at all. Maliki would have resisted or remained limp as before. Sadr's forces would have attacked. Coalition casualties would be up, and so would sectarian killings. But none of these things has happened. Sectarian killings are lower. And despite dramatically increased operations in more exposed settings, so are American casualties. This does not look like hopelessness.

Hope is not victory, of course. The surge has just begun, our enemies are adapting, and fighting is likely to intensify as U.S. and Iraqi forces begin the main clear-and-hold phase. The Maliki government could falter. But it need not, if we do not. Unfortunately, four years of setbacks have conditioned Americans to believe that any progress must be ephemeral. If the Democrats get their way and Gen. Petraeus is undermined in Congress, the progress may indeed prove short-lived. But it's time to stop thinking so hard about how to lose, and to think instead about how to reinforce and exploit the success we have begun to achieve. The debate in Washington hasn't caught up to the realities in Baghdad. Until it does, a resolute president will need to prevent defeatists in Congress from losing a winnable war in Iraq.

--Frederick W. Kagan and William Kristol

In response to Republican Ric (Lawn Boy) Keller's remarks that our involvement in Iraq is like mowing your neighbor's lawn. It is preposterous that he doesn't get it. He is a Republican, sworn to protect and serve...and not a Democrat that typically tries to "stuff" President Bush and to win the 2008 election at all costs. He would have an excuse as a Dem, not as a Republican.

At Victory Caucus ( http://victorycaucus.com ) there was a contest that I wanted to drop a Photoshop Lawn Boy pic....I don't think their server got it up, so it is here...just a little thought Ric...

(From Paul Mirengoff, Powerline) http://powerlineblog.com/
What country does Zbigniew Brzezinski live in?


Zbigniew Brzezinski was the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. Given the disastrous foreign policy of those harrowing years, you wonder how anyone can take him seriously, and it's questionable whether, for decades, many people did. These days, however, Brzezinski is attempting rather successfully to ride hatred of President Bush back into the national debate.

In his latest contribution, Brzezinski claims that our nation is "terrorized" by the war on terror. I fear the old boy doesn't get out much among his fellow Americans. As one who rides at least twice a day nearly every day on the Washington D.C. subway (Metro) -- a known target of terrorists -- I can assure Brzezinski that there is an utter absence of terror in that venue. Nor do I detect the slightest trace of fear when I visit key buildings such as the Pentagon (which was attacked on 9/11) and the U.S. Capitol (which might have been). As far as I can tell, the same is true at the nation's airports, except when imams start praising Osama bin Laden and ordering spare equipment they don't need.

This absence of fear is due in part to the human spirit and its American incarnation. But it's also due to the fact that we haven't been attacked at home for more than five years. And, unless one believes in the tooth fairy, it's counterintuitive to deny that this happy state of affairs owes much to the fact that our government took the threat of terrorism seriously and acted aggressively to thwart terrorists. In short, our government has been preoccupied with the threat of terrorism so we wouldn't have to be.

The only Americans I know who are living in fear are folks like Brzezinski whose partisanship and hatred of the president has caused them to suffer from a strange form of hysteria.

The 'Surge' Is Succeeding
By Robert Kagan (Washington Post)
Sunday, March 11, 2007; Page B07


A front-page story in The Post last week suggested that the Bush administration has no backup plan in case the surge in Iraq doesn't work. I wonder if The Post and other newspapers have a backup plan in case it does.

Leading journalists have been reporting for some time that the war was hopeless, a fiasco that could not be salvaged by more troops and a new counterinsurgency strategy. The conventional wisdom in December held that sending more troops was politically impossible after the antiwar tenor of the midterm elections. It was practically impossible because the extra troops didn't exist. Even if the troops did exist, they could not make a difference.

Four months later, the once insurmountable political opposition has been surmounted. The nonexistent troops are flowing into Iraq. And though it is still early and horrible acts of violence continue, there is substantial evidence that the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of new forces, is having a significant effect.

Some observers are reporting the shift. Iraqi bloggers Mohammed and Omar Fadhil, widely respected for their straight talk, say that "early signs are encouraging." The first impact of the "surge," they write, was psychological. Both friends and foes in Iraq had been convinced, in no small part by the American media, that the United States was preparing to pull out. When the opposite occurred, this alone shifted the dynamic.

As the Fadhils report, "Commanders and lieutenants of various militant groups abandoned their positions in Baghdad and in some cases fled the country." The most prominent leader to go into hiding has been Moqtada al-Sadr. His Mahdi Army has been instructed to avoid clashes with American and Iraqi forces, even as coalition forces begin to establish themselves in the once off-limits Sadr City.

Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's leading counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces tended to raid insurgent and terrorist strongholds and then pull back and hand over the areas to Iraqi forces, who failed to hold them. The Fadhils report, "One difference between this and earlier -- failed -- attempts to secure Baghdad is the willingness of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit enough resources for enough time to make it work." In the past, bursts of American activity were followed by withdrawal and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure Baghdad "is becoming stricter and gaining momentum by the day as more troops pour into the city, allowing for a better implementation of the 'clear and hold' strategy." Baghdadis "always want the 'hold' part to materialize, and feel safe when they go out and find the Army and police maintaining their posts -- the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the troops are staying."

A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The number of security tips about insurgents that Iraqi civilians provide has jumped sharply. Stores and marketplaces are reopening in Baghdad, increasing the sense of community. People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to their homes. As a result, "many Baghdadis feel hopeful again about the future, and the fear of civil war is slowly being replaced by optimism that peace might one day return to this city," the Fadhils report. "This change in mood is something huge by itself."

Apparently some American journalists see the difference. NBC's Brian Williams recently reported a dramatic change in Ramadi since his previous visit. The city was safer; the airport more secure. The new American strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods, grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." U.S. soldiers forged agreements with local religious leaders and pushed al-Qaeda back -- a trend other observers have noted in some Sunni-dominated areas. The result, Williams said, is that "the war has changed."

It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have shifted, political currents have shifted as well. A national agreement on sharing oil revenue appears on its way to approval. The Interior Ministry has been purged of corrupt officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality. And cracks are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition -- a good sign, given that the rock-solid unity was both the product and cause of growing sectarian violence.

There is still violence, as Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda seek to prove that the surge is not working. However, they are striking at more vulnerable targets in the provinces. Violence is down in Baghdad. As for Sadr and the Mahdi Army, it is possible they may reemerge as a problem later. But trying to wait out the American and Iraqi effort may be hazardous if the public becomes less tolerant of their violence. It could not be comforting to Sadr or al-Qaeda to read in the New York Times that the United States plans to keep higher force levels in Iraq through at least the beginning of 2008. The only good news for them would be if the Bush administration in its infinite wisdom starts to talk again about drawing down forces.

No one is asking American journalists to start emphasizing the "good" news. All they have to do is report what is occurring, though it may conflict with their previous judgments. Some are still selling books based on the premise that the war is lost, end of story. But what if there is a new chapter in the story?

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column for The Post. His latest book is "Dangerous Nation," a history of American foreign policy.

All Alone on the Long View in Iraq?
(another in the series of letters from Marine Col. Mike Walker, retired)


Marines,

I freely admit to being a fellow traveler within the
rank and file of the small minority who are optimistic
about Iraq. I blame this on three personal flaws.

First, it was my misfortune to have gained most of my
insights about Iraq by serving there (2003 & 2004).
Alas, you read that correctly, I was one of those poor
souls “stuck” over there despite having an
undergraduate degree from Marquette University and
graduate degree from Harvard University and a nice
civilian job back in the States. I was given every
opportunity to make it in correct society but somehow
wound up in the Marine Corps. I will try to do better
next time.

Second, I must confess to being a loner even within my
generation of fellow service members in that during my
career in the Marines I spent a good deal of time
studying insurgencies and/or modern civil wars which,
even within the military, was a subject largely
eschewed due to the trauma of the Vietnam War.

Finally and perhaps most damning, I have never been
able to catch on the to “I want it now, 24-7” mindset
of most of my friends and acquaintances. I am slow in
this regard. I actively seek to become more patient
and take a broader view amidst an American society
that is seemingly evermore cramming yet something else
into each and every day so it can readily chase after
the next “shiny object.” Iraq and war on terror are
not social unpleasantries to me. They are not
something to be done with because I have grown tired
of them and need to “move on.”

Given all those handicaps, I have been sadly compelled
to think this through for myself having to forego the
blissful privilege of being told what to think by
various combinations of the US “Big Media,”
politicians (of all manner of persuasion, and party),
and/or water cooler/cocktail party/barroom pundits.
Here is what I have concluded:

I believe we are winning in Iraq. I am flawed indeed.
But it gets worse.

I think we have (finally) put all the pieces in place
to assure our victory. Of course, we must give credit
where credit is due and thank the Saddamists for
running both a lousy conventional war in early-to-mid
2003 and an equally inept insurgency since. If your
“Capo di tutti Capo” guy winds up with his neck in a
noose, you are hated by the Kurdish minority, and the
Shi’a majority is screaming for your blood rather than
your return to power, then you certainly can’t take
much pride in your accomplishments.

But things are not as simple as that summary. For
example, in an insurgency, the political strategy is
superior to the military. The Saddamists relied
almost exclusively on the military solution, i.e.
trying to kill off an ever growing list of “enemies.”
First it was Coalition Forces then they added
“collaborators,” then they added in the Iraqi Security
Services centered on an Iraqi Army (when we finally
got past our own sorry reasoning opposing its
creation) and finally they added the Shi’a population
in toto, every man woman and child. Gee whiz, Hitler
and Stalin would have been impressed. But where was
the enemy’s political strategy? Missing and still
missing. They can never win without one but they have
created so many enemies that it is now pretty much
hopeless.

What about the Shi’a? I am optimistic about them too.
We need to take some specific steps such as removing
Muqtada Sadr as a military threat and suppressing the
militias but the overall strategy is working. The
Shi’a led government is off the ideal but as much as
it wheezes and gasps, moves in fits and starts, at the
end of the day it is good enough to get the job done.
Look, we worked to introduce “democracy” into South
Korea beginning in the late 1940’s (even before the
war there began) but it really did not flower until
the 1990’s, it took over half a century for the roots
to really sink in but they did. Never underestimate
the power of an idea or the strength of a
constitutional government. As recent polling has
shown, the Iraqi people are moving towards a
democratic government rather than walking away.

This brings up a final lesson I learned in Iraq.
There is a complex insurgency in Iraq but the Iraqis
are a far more resilient and capable people than most
give them credit for. The will of the Iraqi people
will not allow failure even if we lose ours. I left
with a deep degree of respect and admiration for the
Iraqis I knew over there, from all walks and
ethnicity. One of the most frustrating issues I have
in discussing Iraq with my fellow Americans is real
lack of knowledge about how good the Iraqi people are
and how successful they will continue to be in the
future, if we give them a fair chance. My unshakable
conclusion is that the Iraqi people are going to win
this war for themselves. With our continued support,
it will happen quicker, with less loss of life and one
that will strengthen the position of the United States
in the region and weaken that of our enemies, but in
any case, the Iraqi people will prevail.

The lesson is that it takes time.

Let us look at a timeline for the insurgency in Iraq
as compared to some other historical examples. The
insurgency in El Salvador that began in 1980 took 14
years to end. The Communist insurgency in the
Philippines began 1968 and peaked in 1986 before
becoming ineffective in the early 1990’s, over twenty
years later. Perhaps the best example comes from
Malaya.

In 1948, the Communist Party in Malaya began an
insurgency there. At that time it was a British
colonial possession. The British won the war in 1960.
That war took “only” twelve years to win. Noel Barber
wrote the definitive book on the conflict entitled
“The War of the Running Dogs, How Malaya Defeated the
Communist Guerrillas 1948-1960.” As he reports, the
first four years were a seesaw struggle and the path
to victory took a further eight years. The fight was
tough. Barber admits that the early years were
“tragic and wasted” but they won nonetheless because
they had the will and the vision to take the long
view. It also required a strong financial commitment.
It demanded a strong military presence, some “40,000
troops and 25,000 police and 50,000 special
constables” in order to pull it off in a country with
a population that was less than one fourth of Iraq’s.


They won the political war by giving the Malay people
control of their government (which was not a pretty
thing to see when it first began just as the workings
of the government in Baghdad is sometimes hard to
watch now) and they ensured that the large ethnic
minorities had a sufficiently strong economic and
political voice to win them over as is the case in
Iraq.

If all you looked at were the monthly number of
terrorist attacks and the casualties you could never
have seen the “mess” in Malaya as anything resembling
a victory because it took nearly 12 years to win. We
Americans seem to have no patience for those types of
timelines. For too many it is not a matter of winning
or losing but only a matter of it being too long.
That we would consider basing our national policy on
the rule “if it will take too long then declare
failure and quit” is disheartening to contemplate.

Now I am not suggesting that we need to have 130,000
American soldiers in Iraq for 12 years, quite the
contrary in fact. While many Marines knew in January
2004 that the war in Iraq would probably still be
going on in 2014, we also knew the Iraqis would no
longer need us after several years providing we
ensured the establishment of a constitutional
government and security services centered on the Iraqi
Army. The critical components of that task should be
completed later this year or early next year. So I
too am a member of the majority that thinks the US can
start a major redeployment out of Iraq in the next
12-18 months. By then, there will be an Iraqi
government and security force in place that can do the
heavy lifting for the next seven or eight years that
it will take to finish the war.

But that means the US cannot walk away from Iraq in
2008. We need to stand firm as we did by staying
engaged in Western Europe after 1945 and Korea after
1953 during the Cold War. We may still need to
conduct some combined operations over the next two or
three years where the US provides support to Iraqi
ground forces. We will still need military advisors
to work with the Iraqis for the next four or five
years. We will need to place Iraq high on the list of
countries that we provide foreign aid to for the next
decade or so. We will also need to vouchsafe the
borders of Iraq from a military invasion by Iran
and/or Syria. If we do all that then Iraq will be as
much of a success story as the Marshall Plan and the
Korean Intervention were in the last century.

Or we can sit back, tune into “Big Media,” turn off
our brains, take counsel of our own fears, and cut and
run.

…and if we cut and run now we will conduct, in due
course, a witch hunt to determine “Who Lost Iraq?” and
then throw out all the bums in Washington from both
parties. It will be their just deserves.

Semper Fi,

Mike