Wednesday, April 03, 2013



Mike Walker, Col. USMC (retired)
The Korean Situation (discussion continued below in two more posts)

The latest steps by North Korea have reconfirmed long-held polices by that nation while raising the risks of war to the highest level since the early 1990s.

What we have done right

The actions taken by the Obama administration during the last few weeks have been prudent, important and well founded. Washington has hit an ideal balance of showing strength and clarifying our position to protect the peace while not escalating tensions by making both calm and accurate public statements.

What we do wrong

The ongoing error committed by many, in and out of Washington, is what intelligence professionals call the “mistake of mirror imaging.” Whenever a situation or pending crisis occurs, there are intelligence gaps. The most common and dangerous mistake policy makers can make is to fill the gaps by assuming the other side is some sort of “mirror image” of our self or some other.

For example, if you do not know how local governments are run in country X, the error is to assume they are like American local governments or if you do not understand how their air force trains then you assume they train like the RAF. More dangerously, if you do not have intelligence on their rationale for starting a war or assessing their chances of victory then you assume they think like us. That type of “mirror image” thinking gets people killed.

The Risks

We run great risks in trying to determine what North Korea is going to do for several reasons, but here are the three most important:

First, the intelligence gaps at the North Korean strategic policy level are huge. No other society on earth is more closed and less transparent than North Korea.

Second, there is no other society on earth more determined to wage a war of conquest. The combined policies of Juche, or self-reliance, and Songun, or putting every resource immediately at the disposal of the armed forces, create a radically militarized and warped society.

Third, the disadvantage of a closed society cuts both ways. Virtually every key North Korean leader, especially those in uniform, has a very poor understanding of the United States and the Republic of Korea and is dismissive of the two allies’ military might.

Will there be War?

The greatest unfulfilled dream of the Kim Dynasty is the reunification of Korea under their rule. The “unknown” is how much of a priority the newest Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, places on a war of unification.

It still seems unlikely that Kim will call a meeting to order the army to invade South Korea.

The greater risk is that the Supreme Leader will order an uncontainable military provocation.

The fear is that North Korea will launch a “limited” military strike to trigger a South Korean response by inflicting death and destruction on South Korea. The Great Leader may then decided to escalate the “limited” incident to teach the South Koreans a lesson they will not soon forget.

If the military actions escalate beyond a local strike then the war hawks in North Korea – probably led by recently appointed military commander Kim Yong-chol – will begin to whisper to the Supreme Leader that we must strike now while we are ready and before the South Koreans can mobilize or the Americans come to their aid.

The Consequences

If, God forbid, a general war breaks out and North Korea targets the civilian population in Seoul, then the slaughter of thousands of innocent men, women, and children will galvanize the South. There will soon arise a consensus that this can never be allowed to happen again. Outside diplomats, especially those in Beijing, may think a peace with a status quo ante may be possible, but the South Koreans who hold the bodies of their innocent dead children can and will drive the war to a different conclusion: the destruction of the Kim Dynasty.

China needs to understand this and needs to understand that supporting North Korea while South Korean and American soldiers are in battle will fundamentally redefine China’s relationship with the Pacific region and all for the worse. If North Korea begins a general war then the BEST solution for all, especially China, is the destruction of the North Korean regime. A unified Korea under the leadership in Seoul is in the best interests of the Korean people, and would also lead to the withdrawal of US forces on the Korean peninsula, a plus for everyone, to include the rulers in Beijing.

Semper Fi,

Mike


April 4, 2012 (continued from above)
Harry,

The NKs "know" they are tougher than the South Koreans, it is an article of faith and not subject to analysis or reflection. 

Also remember that until the mid-1970s, the NK standard of living was higher than that of South Korea (due to the fact that most of the 1950-1953 war was fought in the south and that Japan built all the industries and production facilities in the north because of access to water and hydroelectric power from the mountain dams they built (like the Chosin Reservoir)).

As for the spies, the message does not get through and here are two quick stories:

The #4 leader in NK, Hwang Jang-yop,  defected in the late 1990s and was flabbergasted at how strong and rich South Korea was -- showing that even the most senior leaders were living in a "dream world." 

On the other end of the spectrum, a special operations commando trained to infiltrate South Korea went on a mission that went bad and was captured at a farm house.

Asked why he did not eat and flee, he explained that he felt he had severals hours to get away as no farmers in NK have telephones in their homes -- only very senior communist party (WPK) officials have home phones.  

His conclusion: It was "impossible" for a South Korean farmer to telephone the police.

From top to bottom, the NKs underestimate their enemy (ROK/US). That is why a war of miscalculation keeps people awake at night: The NKs believe their own propaganda.

Mike

April 5, 2012 (continued from above)

RE: China

You are right, in my opinion, in concluding that China does not currently want a unified Korea under Seoul. My imperfect point was that we need to talk to the Chinese now and let them know where we stand and how that stand can benefit China if they think it through.

If we point out the history of German reunification in the 1990's then they should see that Korea would be tied up "fixing" the north for the next two decades, making it a non-existent threat. Add in the fact that their nightmare about a massive flow of refugees into NE China would go away as N Koreans want to go south plus the advantage mentioned about getting the US military out of the Korean peninsula and they might change their mind.

RE: Influencing NK Leaders

If I learned one thing over three decades of watching NK leaders, it is that when it comes to major policy positions they are going to do what they want to do -- and to hell with everyone else. 

Beyond bizarre extremes (we surrender unconditionally to NK's demands or we declare war on NK), almost everything we do or say is irrelevant on major NK policy choices. Our limited leverage only works when dealing with lower-tier policy issues.

And therein lies the rub.

We, and most of the rest of the international community, keep offering carrots and sticks to modify their behavior on big issues. For NK, if the pursuit of major policy coincides with getting rewarded then fine, they will take it, and if that means getting punished, they will take on that as well.

It is equally true that they will manipulate the negotiations to get everything they can get: Their philosophy is that that there is a sucker born everyday and someone has to fleece the fool so it may as well be NK.

The problem with that reality is that to many onlookers, the acceptance of rewards and punishments creates an illusion that outside influences can modify/change NK's stance on a major policy position, which of course, is untrue.

Add in the American control freaks on the right and left who feel Washington is sole source of world power, and you have a lot people running around with very wrongheaded ideas.

Mike